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JUDGES IN LAWYERLESS COURTS
Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan, Jessica K. Steinberg, & Alyx Mark*
110 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2022)
The typical American civil trial court is lawyerless. In response to the challenge of pro se litigation,
scholars, advocates, judges, and courts have embraced a key solution: reforming the judge’s traditional
role. The prevailing vision calls on trial judges to set aside traditional judicial passivity, simplify court
procedures, and offer a range of assistance and accommodation to people without counsel.
Despite widespread support for judicial role reform, we know little of whether and how judges are
implementing pro se assistance recommendations. Our lack of knowledge stands in stark contrast to
the responsibility civil trial judges bear – and the power they wield – in dispensing justice for millions
of unrepresented people each year. While today’s civil procedure scholarship focuses on documenting
and analyzing growing judicial discretion in complex litigation, a much larger sphere of unexamined
and largely unchecked judicial discretion has been hiding in plain sight in state civil trial courts.
This Article’s theoretically-driven multijurisdictional study of judicial behavior in lawyerless courts
contributes to literatures in civil procedure, judicial behavior, and access to justice. It examines three
state civil courts in jurisdictions that rank at the top, middle, and bottom of the Justice Index (a
ranking of state and national access to justice efforts). Despite major jurisdictional differences and
contrary to conventional wisdom, judges’ behavior is surprisingly homogenous in the data. Rather than
offering simplification and accommodation to pro se litigants as reforms suggest, judges maintained
courts’ complexity and exercised strict control over evidence presentation. The Article theorizes that
this unexpected finding reflects a core structural reality – civil courts were not designed for unrepresented
people. And judicial behavior is shaped by three factors that result from civil justice system design:
ethical ambiguity and traditional assumptions about a judge’s role, docket pressure, and pre-hearing
case development provided to only one party.
In theory, judicial assistance to pro se litigants is a low-cost, practical solution to the problem of
lawyerless courts. In practice, the vision for judicial role reform may overpromise what individual judges
can do and underestimate implementation challenges. This study suggests that the legal and structural
scaffolding to support judicial assistance to pro se litigants is woefully insufficient. The Article concludes
the vision for judicial role reform will not be realized without formal legal requirements, consistent
feedback about implementation, and a reduction in existing docket pressures.
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INTRODUCTION
You don’t come here to the court to have your little disagreement. You don’t answer
my questions, and you won’t get heard at all. 1
It is so hard just to be the referee but also want to get involved. 2
State civil trial courts and judges have changed. 3 Thirty years ago, nearly every
party in these courts had a lawyer. 4 At that time, lawyers were expected to drive
litigation through adversarial procedures and the judge had a clear, specific role:
passive umpire. 5
Today, state civil trial courts are largely lawyerless. 6 As a result, millions of lowto middle-income people without counsel or legal training must protect and defend
their rights and interests in courts that were designed by lawyers and for lawyers. 7
*Anna E. Carpenter is Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Jessica K.
Steinberg is Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Colleen F.
Shanahan is Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Alyx Mark is Assistant Professor of
Government, Wesleyan University. We thank David Engstrom, Dr. Rebecca Sandefur, Dr. Thomas
Clarke, Dr. Michele Statz, and the participants in the 6th Annual Civil Procedure Workshop for feedback
on drafts of this article. This article and the underlying study would not have been possible without the
help of the following stellar research assistants: Hilary Adkins, Michelle Bigony, Emily Bock, Anne
Bonfiglio, Sophia Goh, Greg Hewitt, Esther Jiang, Joshua Katz, Michaela Lovejoy, Aryeh Mellman,
Michelle Rodriguez, Seojin Park, Lindsay Pearlman Hannibal, Elenore Wade, and Mason Walther.
Special thanks to Catherine Twigg for her work on data collection. Thanks to our institutions for
research support.
1 Quote from a judge interviewed for this study, Centerville Judge 4. See Part II infra for a description
of this study’s methods.
2 Centerville Judge 1.
3 Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan, & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New” Civil
Judges, 2018 WISC. L. REV. 249 (2018) (describing the access to justice crisis in state civil courts and
offering a theoretical framework to support future research on trial judge behavior that includes four
factors: disappearing adversary process, in-person interactions, an ethically ambiguous judicial role,
and static written law)
4 See, e.g., CIVIL JUST. SURVEY OF ST. CTS, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 1992 (1995).
5 See Norman W. Spaulding, Essay, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1391 (2008).
6 We define lawyerless courts as those where more than three-quarters of cases involve at least one
unrepresented party.
7 We and other scholars have written and conducted extensive empirical research to document the civil
justice challenges facing low- to middle-income people, including those who end up involved in
litigation and those whose legal problems never make it to a lawyer or see the inside of the courtroom.
See, e.g., Rebecca Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs of the Public, 67 S.C. L.
REV. 443 (2016); Michele Statz, Robert Friday & Jon Bredeson, Why Prevailing Access to Justice Initiatives
Fail Rural Americans (on file with authors); Lauren Sudeall & Daniel Pasciuti, Praxis and Paradox: Inside
the Black Box of Dispossessory Court in Suburban and Rural Georgia (on file with authors); Tonya L. Brito,
Producing Justice in Poor People’s Courts: Four Models of State Legal Actors, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 145
(2020); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 305; Llezlie Green, Wage Theft in State
Courts, 107 CAL. L. REV. (2019); Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV.
1031, 1036 (“Local courts—and not federal courts—are the starting point from which we should define
and evaluate our system of justice.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving, 93 N.Y.U. L.
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Court data suggests more than three-quarters of all civil cases have at least one
unrepresented party and in some areas, such as family law, nearly all cases involve two
unrepresented parties. 8
To make matters worse, the issues at stake in these courts are deeply connected
to fundamental human needs such as safety, intimate relationships, housing, and
financial security. 9 Many of the people who find themselves pulled into civil court for
issues ranging from medical debt to guardianship of an aging parent are already
suffering the consequences of America’s fraying—or nonexistent—social and
economic safety nets. 10 Too many of those who must represent themselves in civil
trial courts are already living at or close to the edge of any person’s capacity for selfadvocacy.
Over the past two decades, legal scholars, judges, and other experts have
advanced a key solution for lawyerless courts: a revised judicial role where judges cast
away traditional passivity to actively assist and accommodate pro se litigants. 11
Proponents have highlighted the practicality and efficiency of judicial intervention in
pro se cases, particularly when compared to the cost of providing legal assistance and
services for every litigant before they enter the courtroom. 12 As this vision has taken
REV. 1580 (2018); Allyson E. Gold, No Home for Justice: How Eviction Perpetuates Health Inequity Among
Low-Income Tenants, 24 GEO. J. POV. L. POL’Y 60 (2017); Victor Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice
Design, 121 PENN STATE L. REV 745 (2017); Mary Spector & Ann Baddour, Collection Texas-Style: An
Analysis of Consumer Collection Practices in and out of the Courts, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1427 (2016); Sara Sternberg
Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1296 (2016); Colleen F. Shanahan,
Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little Representation be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L. J. 1367
(2016); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People's Courts, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 473 (2015); Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt
Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 179 (2014); Tanina Rostain, Techno-Optimsim & Access to the
Legal System, 148 DAEDALUS 93 (2019): Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving, 93 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1580 (2018); Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal
Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949 (2009). See also, Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion
and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2101 (2019) (positing that federal court expansion may
lead to underinvestment in state-level courts).
8 See Paula Hannaford-Agor et al., The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.
& ST. JUST. INST. vii (2015). Many studies show that 80-90 percent of family law cases that do not
involve the government involve two unrepresented parties. See, e.g., Jessica Steinberg, Demand Side Reform
in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN L. REV. 746, 751 (2015) [hereinafter Steinberg, Demand Side Reform].
9 See Sandefur, supra note 7, at 443–44.
10 Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 DAEDALUS 128,
133 (2019) (arguing that state civil courts have become the government institution of last resort in a
system where the legislative and executive branches have either perpetuated or ignored growing
economic and social inequality).
11 See infra Part I for a full discussion of these arguments and this scholarship.
12 See e.g. Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227
(2010) [hereinafter Barton, Against Civil Gideon]; Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging
Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (2012); NAT’L CTR. FOR ST.
CTS.,
JUST.
FOR
ALL
INITIATIVE
GUIDANCE
MATERIALS
32
(2019),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/25464/pdf-jfa-guidance-materials.pdf
[hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL MATERIALS].
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hold and rates of pro se cases have grown, judges have been charged with new
expectations, including simplifying courtroom procedures, filling information gaps for
unrepresented people, actively developing the factual record in trials, identifying legal
issues, and otherwise exercising vast and nearly unfettered discretion to patch holes in
our state-level civil justice systems. 13 In response to these calls for change, many states
have altered judicial ethics rules to provide that “reasonable accommodations” for pro
se litigants do not violate a judge’s duty of impartiality. This change has spurred training
and advisory materials encouraging judges to assist people without counsel. 14
Though this monumental shift has been unfolding across the country for
decades, few studies have documented how judges interact with unrepresented people
in state trial courts as a general matter. 15 And, until now, we have lacked comparative,
empirical data about changes in judicial assistance to pro se litigants. Historically, as we
have explained and analyzed in previous work, legal scholars have ignored state civil
trial courts. 16 Today, most scholarship on civil procedure and judicial behavior focuses
on complex and appellate litigation in federal courts where the bulk of case processing
activity and party engagement with court procedures occurs outside of the courtroom,
via the exchange of pleadings. 17 Scholars writing about federal courts are concerned
with an expanding sphere of unreviewable judicial discretion and the phenomena of
For previous work describing and defining the changing judicial role and the evolution of procedural
norms in courts where most cases lack lawyers, see generally Hannah Lieberman, Uncivil Procedure: How
State Court Proceedings Perpetuate Inequality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 257 (2016) (critically reviewing the
operation of civil procedure in consumer debt cases); Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra
note 4; Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice,
2016 BYU L. REV. 899 (2016) [hereinafter Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown] (describing the breakdown of
adversary procedure in ordinary, two-party cases including judges’ confusion about their proper role
and calling for an affirmative duty for courts and judges to drive civil litigation in pro se courts); Colleen
F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV.
215 (2018) (examining how judges can increase or decrease access to courts through pre-hearing
procedures); Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647 (2018)
(offering three possible dimensions of active judging behavior to assist pro se litigants in and presenting
data on the prevalence of these behaviors).
14 See infra Part I(C).
15 See generally Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13. For other examples from a small body of
research, see id.; Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices
in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Fundamentals of
Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467 (1988);
Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and How to Improve It, 16 J.L. & SOC’Y 61 (2014); Vicki
Lens et al., Choreographing Justice: Administrative Law Judges and the Management of Welfare Disputes, 40 J.L. &
SOC’Y 199 (2013).
16 For discussions about and explanations of why legal scholarship has paid so little attention to state
civil courts, see Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 4; Stephen C. Yeazell, Courting
Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About Our Most Important Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 129 (2014). Today, this
trend appears to be changing as more scholars have begun exploring state civil justice. See, e.g., Jonathan
Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1031 (2020); Zachary D. Clopton,
Making State Civil Procedure, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2019); Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local
Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707 (2015); Annie Decker, A Theory of Local Common Law,
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1939 (2014).
17 Most legal scholarship that does engage with state-level civil justice focuses on state appellate
courts. See e.g., Marin K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (2020).
13
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ad hoc, party-driven procedural rules. 18 Some critics argue these trends lack
transparency, do not reflect democratic values, and ultimately damage judicial
legitimacy. 19 These same concerns apply to the evolving judicial role in state civil trial
courts.
Compared to federal judges, trial judges in state-level courts have more
discretion because most parties lack representation, cases are rarely appealed, and court
records are sparse and difficult to access. 20 In state trial courts, party engagement with
judges and procedures happens in real-time, in the courtroom, with little to no
discovery or exchange of pleadings. 21 Often, no lawyer other than the judge is involved
in observing, let alone driving, the litigation process. In state civil trial courts, a lack of
party control over procedure collides with nearly unfettered and unreviewable trial
judge discretion. Indeed, the vision for judicial assistance to pro se litigants as an access
to justice solution doubles-down on judicial power because judges are asked to offer
assistance, manage procedures, and decide cases.
This Article presents findings from the first study to investigate judicial
behavior in lawyerless courts through a comparative, multijurisdictional research
design that leverages key similarities and distinctions between jurisdictions to examine
our assumptions about judicial behavior. The study examines three geographically,
demographically, and politically varied jurisdictions that rank at the top, bottom, and
middle of the Justice Index—a measure of access to justice reform. 22 The data includes
18 See e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821 (2018); Robin Effron, Ousted:
The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2018); David L. Noll,
What DO MDL Leaders Do?: Evidence from Leadership Appointment Orders, 24 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV.
433 (2020); Pamela Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (2017). For a
seminal work on judicial intervention and management in complex litigation, see generally Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
19 Robin Effron has made the case that, in the complex litigation context, the growing sphere of judicial
discretion is linked to private procedural ordering, with parties increasingly co-managing litigation in
collaboration with managerial judges. See Effron, supra note 18, at 169–174.
20 See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 305 (2018) (arguing that the cost of
pursuing litigation deters pro se parties from enforcing their rights); Decker, supra note 16, at 1968–69
(discussing factors that make appeals from lower courts unlikely); Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E.
Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1387 (2016)
(discussing the importance of law reform activity, including appeals, in state civil courts and arguing
that such activity is rare where parties lack full lawyer representation). For related methodological
discussions, see Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to
Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101 (2013) (setting out an expansive agenda for access to justice research and
calling for scholars to make a range of theoretical and empirical contributions to better understand the
operation of the civil justice system, including how everyday Americans experience law and the justice
system); Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 4.
21 See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Helping the Pro Se Litigant: A Changing Landscape, 39 CT. REV. 8, 14–15
(2003).
22 Our assessment of each jurisdiction is based on our own original research, which we describe in Part
II, as well as aggregating sources, such as the Justice Index, which ranks states’ access to justice reform
efforts, including reform of the judicial role. See, e.g., Composite Index: Overall Scores and Rankings, JUSTICE
INDEX, https://justiceindex.org/2016-findings (last visited July 31, 2020).
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qualitative and quantitative data about how judges from different parts of the country
use their discretion and responsibility as they manage civil litigation in lawyerless
courts, including whether they are offering pro se assistance recommended by their
state’s judicial role reform.
The study’s data capture the courtroom behavior and perspectives of judges in
three U.S. jurisdictions while holding the law, in effect, constant. The data include 200
hours of live court observation, verbatim transcription of 357 hearings where at least
one person lacked counsel, and interviews with observed judges. With these data, we
consider how geographic, political, and demographic variations across jurisdictions –
as well as in their purported levels of commitment to ethics rules reform and judicial
training – may or may not contribute to inter-jurisdictional differences in judicial
behavior.
We expected to find significant differences in judges’ behavior across study
sites, based on different jurisdictional guidance and the general wide range of
courtroom behavior in state civil trial courts. We did not find what we expected.
Instead, we found surprising homogeneity and a shared approach characterized not by
simplicity and accommodation for pro se litigants but by complexity and control. Judges
maintained legal and procedural complexity in their courtrooms by offering only the
most limited explanations of court procedures and legal terms and refusing to answer
litigants’ questions. Judges exercised control by tightly managing evidence
presentation, relying heavily on petitioners’ pleadings to shape fact development, and
limiting the evidence they were willing to hear from either party, particularly from
defendants.
Drawing on our data, we provide explanations for these unexpected results,
including judges’ self-reported confusion about ethical boundaries, the pressure they
face to clear cases in crowded dockets, and imbalanced case development. These
results suggest that judicial role reform, currently a widely accepted solution to massive
gaps in legal services, is not being implemented in the way its proponents envision.
These courts may be lawyerless, but judges’ behavior ensures they remained lawyercentric.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly reviews the evolution of judicial
role reform over the past few decades, including the formal law and judicial ethics rules
governing judges’ interactions with litigants who are unrepresented. This Part ends by
summarizing a body of advisory materials on role reform developed by scholars,
courts, and access to justice think-tanks. This guidance asks judges to help pro se parties
in two key ways: by offering explanations and information about legal standards,
procedures, and technical terms and developing a full factual record through party
testimony and judicial questioning. Part II presents our research design and methods
and describes the cases and jurisdictions in the study sample. Part III presents the
7
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results of our study. Here, we draw on interviews and court observations to analyze
how judges across jurisdictions maintained legal and procedural complexity and tightly
controlled case presentation in the lawyerless courts where they preside. We then
discuss three possible factors that might shape the behavior we observed: judges’
ethical confusion and traditional assumptions, docket pressure, and robust pre-hearing
assistance provided to only one party. In Part IV, we conclude that, in practice,
realizing the judicial role reform vision will require courts to invest much more in
developing legal rules and systems to support pro se assistance by trial judges. To that
end, we recommend courts develop formal, detailed requirements for pro se
assistance, create peer-review and feedback systems, and give judges more time to
handle cases given their new responsibilities.
I.

JUDICIAL ROLE REFORM AS ACCESS TO JUSTICE SOLUTION

Today, it is accepted wisdom that reforming the role of judges is a crucial
access to justice solution in lawyerless trial courts. For more than twenty years, legal
scholars, judicial and court associations, court administrators, and other civil justice
stakeholders have called for judges to let go of the traditional, passive judicial stance
and actively assist people without counsel. Most commentators have argued for
voluntary action by individual judges 23 and the formal legal framework for judicial pro
se assistance is limited to thin case law and vaguely permissive ethical rules, leaving
individual judges with the discretion and responsibility to implement this new role.
Though formal legal guidance is lacking, there is no shortage of advisory guidance
prescribing how judges should interact with pro se litigants, including materials
developed by state court administrative bodies.
In this Part, we first briefly review the history of scholarship and expert
commentary advocating for a changed judicial role as a solution to the access to justice
crisis in state courts. Second, we describe the status of formal law and judicial ethics,
which generally authorize judges to accommodate pro se litigants but remain largely
silent on the appropriate scope and depth of judicial interventions. Third, we
summarize the guidance and best practices on judging in pro se courts developed by
scholars, state court systems, and non-profit access to justice organizations. Drawing
on this guidance, we define two core aspects of the role reform vision. First, judges
are encouraged to offer transparent, accessible explanations of law and procedure
throughout the litigation process. Second, they are urged to elicit information,
including narrative testimony, to build the factual record and ensure parties are fully
heard.

23

We discuss exceptions below, including work by Jessica Steinberg and Russell Pearce.
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A. CALLS FOR REFORM
More than twenty years ago, when rates of pro se litigation were on the rise,
legal scholars began calling for and describing a new judicial role in trial courts. 24 Since
then, pro se cases have become the majority and legal scholars concerned with access
to justice have consistently argued for an end to traditional judicial passivity in favor
of an active, interventionist role in lawyerless cases. 25 Many supporters have praised
role reform as an efficient and pragmatic access to justice solution. 26 Most scholars
have advocated for retraining, guidance, and voluntary action by individual judges,
including encouraging judges to ask questions, offer information, and adjust
procedural rules. At least two commentators have pushed for a mandatory approach
that requires judges to offer certain types of assistance. 27 Today, the permissive,
voluntary approach prevails.
Criticisms of the traditional, passive judicial role in pro se cases appeared in legal
scholarship in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. At that time, formal law, including
judicial ethics rules, generally required judges to be “impartial” in their interactions
with all parties, with the underlying assumption that most parties would be
Early work includes: JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A
REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998) [hereinafter GOLDSCHMIDT,
MEETING THE CHALLENGE]; RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM
THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002) [hereinafter ZORZA, SELF-HELP
FRIENDLY COURT] (suggesting how to design a court for pro se litigants); Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro
Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36
(2002) (discussing judicial resistance to assistance for pro se litigants and asserting judicial obligations
to provide assistance) [hereinafter Goldschmidt, Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle]; Rebecca A. Albrecht, John M.
Greacen, Bonnie Rose Hough & Richard Zorza, Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-Represented
Litigants, 42 JUDGES’ J. 16 (2003) (calling for judicial role reform and proposing best practices); Russell
G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and
Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004); Richard Zorza, The Disconnect
Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro
Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2004) [hereinafter
Zorza, The Disconnect] (arguing judicial assistance to pro se parties is consistent with impartiality and
fairness). See also Jane Spinak, Judicial Leadership in Family Court: A Cautionary Tale, 10 TENN. J. L.& POL’Y
47 (2014) (discussing the current trends toward judicial problem solving roles in family court, and their
historical antecedents).
24

More recent work includes: Barton, Against Civil Gideon, supra note 12 (arguing an active role for judges
is a key solution to the crisis facing state trial courts); Barton & Bibas, supra note 12, at 985 (arguing for
pro se court reform, including judicial assistance, rather than civil Gideon); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial
Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. L. REV. 325 (2010) (charging judges with
the responsibility to modify rigid roles); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999) [hereinafter Engler,
And Justice for All] (calling for judicial intervention and assistance as a key element of access to justice
court reform); Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y, 367, 368, 376 (2008) [hereinafter Engler, Ethics in Transition];
Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869 (2009) (asserting that
closing the justice gap calls for concerted efforts from all stakeholders, including courts, and calling for
pro se court reform); Steinberg, Demand Side Reform, supra note 8.
26 See infra Part II(a).
27 Id.
25
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represented. Until 2010, judicial canons were silent about judicial behavior in pro se
cases. 28 Thus, early critics of judicial passivity focused on arguing that judges could, as
a matter of ethics, actively engage with litigants—such as asking questions to develop
the record or explaining a procedural step—while still maintaining their impartiality
and neutrality under then-existing ethical rules. 29
One of the first legal scholars to advocate for changes to the judge’s role,
Russell Engler, began writing on the topic as early as 1999. Engler’s seminal work
highlighted the then-increasing rates of unrepresented people in state courts,
articulated the challenges they faced in navigating court processes and argued that
judges, with the support of ethical guidance and retraining, could offer assistance and
support to those without counsel. 30 Engler documented uncertainty among judges and
other court staff about the permissible boundaries for their interactions with
unrepresented people and noted the lack of guidelines to help judges “redefine” their
roles. 31 He emphasized that, at the time, many trial judges assumed that appearing in
court without counsel was a rational, considered choice as opposed to something
forced upon some litigants by the unavailability or unaffordability of legal assistance. 32
As a result, some judges believed that people without counsel should “live with the
consequences” of their decisions. 33 However, Engler also documented signs of shifts
in judicial attitudes, including directives from some state courts instructing their trial
judges to “set up different procedures” in pro se cases. 34
In response to these dynamics, Engler and others writing at the time argued
that being impartial does not inherently require judges to be passive. 35 Engler
suggested that judicial assistance for people without counsel in trial courts could be
modeled after the practices of small claims and administrative judges who, at the time,
were more commonly expected to deal with unrepresented people and help them
advance their cases while also maintaining impartiality. 36 Ultimately, Engler’s work
asserted that judges could and should assist unrepresented people in a range of ways,
including developing facts, identifying claims and defenses, assessing what sort of
assistance or information the litigant might have received prior to coming to the
Id.; see also Engler, Ethics in Transition, supra note 25, at 370.
See supra note 24; Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 25, at 2028 (noting unrepresented people are
“forced to make choices at every turn without understanding either the range of options available or
the pros and cons of each option”).
30 Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 25, at 1988.
31 Id. at 1991.
32 Id. at 1988–89.
33 Id. at 1998.
34 Engler, Ethics in Transition, supra note 25, at 372–73.
35 GOLDSCHMIDT, MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 24; ZORZA, SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT;
supra note 24; Goldschmidt, Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle, supra note 24; Albrecht, Greacen, Hough, & Zorza,
supra note 24; Zorza, The Disconnect, supra note 24.
36 Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 25, at 2017–2019, 2028–29 (“Far from offending notions of
impartiality, the call for judges to provide vigorous assistance to unrepresented litigants is consistent
with the need for impartiality.”).
28
29
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courtroom, and correcting any misunderstandings, particularly in the context of
settlement agreements with a represented opposing party. 37
Following Engler’s early work, Deborah Rhode’s seminal book, Access to Justice,
was published in 2004 and sparked a broader conversation about the growth of pro se
parties in state courts, the lack of legal assistance for the public more broadly, and the
legal profession’s responsibility for these systemic challenges. 38 Russell Pearce
explicitly cited Rhode’s book as the inspiration for his argument that judges should be
affirmatively required to assist unrepresented people, particularly by ensuring that
procedural errors do not block people without counsel from presenting relevant
evidence and arguments. 39 In Pearce’s words, the “paradigm of judge as passive
umpire” should to be replaced with the “paradigm of judge as active umpire.” 40
Around the same time, Richard Zorza, scholar and founder of the SelfRepresented Litigation Network (a clearinghouse for access to civil justice best
practices), wrote a series of papers calling for judges to take an active role in cases
involving unrepresented people. 41 Zorza emphasized the importance of transparency
and judicial “engagement” with parties and detailed the downsides of judicial passivity
with a strong emphasis on the risk that party confusion, intimidation, or lack of
understanding would result in judges missing the chance to hear relevant evidence or
legal arguments. Zorza, like others writing at the time, also argued that passive judging
created risks for courts as institutions, potentially threatening their legitimacy in the
eyes of the public. 42 To minimize risks to substantive justice and court legitimacy,
Zorza asserted that judges should explain legal standards and the steps of the litigation
process, regularly confirm understanding with litigants, ask questions of litigants to
elicit relevant facts, and clearly explain the judge’s decision and its consequences. 43
37

Id.

Judges should conduct trials in the manner “best suited to discover the facts and do
justice in the case.” “In an effort to…secur[e] substantial justice,” the court must
assist the unrepresented litigant on procedure to be followed, presentation of
evidence, and questions of law. Further, the court may call witnesses and conduct
direct or cross examinations. The court has a “basic obligation to develop a full and
fair record…” Each of these duties is not only wholly consistent with the notion of
impartiality, but also necessary for the system to maintain its impartiality.

Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 25, at 2028–30 (internal citations omitted) (citing Mass. Unif. Sm.
Cl. R. 7(c); Fla. Ct. Sm. Cl. R. 7.140(e); Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 286(b); Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting McConnell v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 604, 606 (5th
Cir. 1981))).
38 DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004).
39 Pearce, supra note 24, at 970–72.
40 Id. at 970.
41 See Zorza, The Disconnect, supra note 24, at 426–31; ZORZA, SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT, supra note
24, at 109–114; Richard Zorza, Courts in the 21st Century: The Access to Justice Transformation, 49 JUDGES J.
14 (2010) [hereinafter Zorza, 21st Century].
42 See Zorza, The Disconnect, supra note 24, at 438–39.
43 Id.; Zorza, 21st Century, supra note 41, at 4.
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In a paper comparing the possibility of pro se court reform to the alternative of
a legal right to counsel for all civil litigants, Benjamin Barton called for retraining
judges to assist people without counsel and asked readers to “imagine a world where
the courts that deal with the poor are so simple, efficient, transparent, and pleasant
that for once the justice system of the poor was the envy of the rich. Pro se court reform
actually offers this possibility.” 44 Barton criticized calls for an expanded right to
counsel in civil cases, comparing the promise of “civil Gideon” to the pragmatic reality
of how the right to counsel operates in the criminal context and argued that the need
for lawyers in civil courts could be eliminated in the first place if those courts became
systematically more accessible to people without counsel, including through a rethinking of the judicial role. 45 Barton also asserted the pragmatic value of judicial role
reform, a view that other scholars and advocates for role reform share. 46 As the
National Center for State Courts states in its Justice for All Initiative Guidance
Materials, “It is more effective to train one judge on how to assist a self-represented
litigant than to teach hundreds of SRLs how to be lawyers.” 47
A more recent proposal advanced by one of the authors of this Article, Jessica
Steinberg, makes a more expansive argument about the type of judicial role reform
needed to solve the crisis of lawyerless courts. 48 Steinberg’s ambitious proposal calls
for fundamental changes to the judges’ role and judicial ethics but, critically, also for
removing the norm of party-driven litigation in civil courts. Drawing on the model of
Social Security Administration disability claim adjudication, where judges have
affirmative case development duties, Steinberg proposes a new set of procedural and
evidentiary rules that require courts and judges to bear the burden of moving cases
through the litigation process, including providing form pleadings, serving process,
scheduling hearings, developing the factual record, raising potential legal claims, and
drafting orders. 49
Today, as we describe in the next section, formal law is still mostly silent or
vague about what judges can and should be doing in their interactions with
unrepresented people. Courts have not created affirmative requirements of judicial
assistance such as those advocated by Pearce and Steinberg.

Barton, Against Civil Gideon, supra note 12, at 1228, 1273.
See id. at 1227–28, 1233–34 (“If a systematic effort were made to simplify the law and procedure in
courts with large pro se dockets, it could improve outcomes in those courts and do more for the poor
than a guarantee of counsel, all at less cost.”).
46 See e.g., id.; Barton & Bibas, supra note 12.
47 See e.g., JUSTICE FOR ALL MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 32.
48 See generally Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13.
49 See id. at 947–965.
44
45

12

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793724

B. THIN FORMAL LAW
Early advocates of judicial role reform developed persuasive arguments that
judges who affirmatively accommodated and assisted pro se litigants by asking
questions, explaining legal standards, or modifying procedural rules, for example, were
not violating ethical duties of impartiality and neutrality. 50 Such arguments, along with
the pragmatic reality of the growing pro se crisis, influenced the American Bar
Association and many states to alter judicial ethics rules. The American Bar
Association changed the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 2010 to clarify that
providing “reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to
have their matters fairly heard” does not violate judicial impartiality. 51 Many states,
though not all, have followed suit. 52 A handful of states, including one of those in our
study, have adopted more detailed judicial ethics rules that outline specific actions a
judge may take and more strongly encourage pro se assistance. 53
While most jurisdictions now permit judges to take an active, accommodating
role in pro se cases, formal law largely leaves the task of operationalizing this role up to
individual trial judges. Appellate opinions discussing pro se assistance are limited,
insufficient, and contradictory, particularly considering the massive numbers of civil

See Engler, Ethics in Transition, supra note 25, at 372–73; see also Zorza, supra note 24; CYNTHIA GRAY,
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, REACHING OUT OR OVERREACHING: JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELFREPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2005) (argues active judging practices do not violate ethics or compromise
the impartiality).
51 In 2010, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct was modified, in Rules 2.2 and 2.6, to explicitly
allow judges to make accommodations for unrepresented people, clarifying that doing so is not a
violation of the duty of impartiality. Rule 2.2 states, “A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall
perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.” Comment 4 to Rule 2.2 states, “It is not a
violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the
opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.” Rule 2.6 states, “A judge shall accord to every person
who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.”
Commentary 2 to Rule 2.6 states, “Among the factors that a judge should consider when deciding upon
an appropriate settlement practice for a case are…whether the parties and their counsel are relatively
sophisticated in legal matters….[or] whether any parties are unrepresented by counsel…” MODEL
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010), MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.6 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2010).
52 See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13, at 932.
53 An example from Maine:
50

A judge may take affirmative steps, consistent with the law, as the judge deems
appropriate to enable an unrepresented litigant to be heard. A judge may explain the
requirements of applicable rules and statutes so that a person appearing before the
judge understands the process to be employed. A judge may also inform
unrepresented individuals of free or reduced cost legal or other assistance that is
available in the courthouse or elsewhere.
Me. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.6(C).
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cases and trial court work that touches unrepresented parties. 54 A recent analysis found
that appellate courts “often issue opinions laden with stock language advising judges
to adhere to adversary procedure but also to ensure substantive justice is achieved,”
but without instruction on how to actually strike this balance. 55 Some appellate courts
have ruled that judges may engage in a wide range of active judging behavior, often
citing deference to trial judge discretion, but courts have been very hesitant to require
judges to assist pro se parties, sometimes explicitly stating that judges have no such
duty. 56 As an exception to the general rule that judges have no duty to assist people
without counsel, some appellate courts have held trial judges should construe pro se
pleadings liberally, give them multiple opportunities to amend, and advise them how
to respond to a motion for summary judgment. 57
As a matter of law, it is clear that American civil trial judges generally have the
discretion to assist pro se litigants if they choose, but in most jurisdictions, formal law
offers little beyond this broad authorization. As a result, judges cannot look to formal
law to identify the permissible bounds of any assistance they might offer. Recognizing
that in the absence of formal law, this reform opportunity rests on individual behavior,
civil justice reform experts, think-tanks, and court administrative bodies that have
developed informal guidance to try and change that behavior.
C. GUIDANCE FOR JUDGES
As trial judges have wrestled with the challenge of pro se majorities filling their
courtrooms—and in the relative absence of formal legal rules—scholars, courts,
judges, and other experts have produced a large body of guidance, best practices, and
training materials aimed at shaping and influencing judges’ behavior. Sources include

Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13, at 904. This dearth of appellate treatment is related to a
topic of the authors’ future work: the phenomenon of generally limited law development in substantive
legal areas with pro se majorities.
55 Id.
56 See e.g., Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H. 1979); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987); see also Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13,
at 927 (citing Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), as “an example of
the courts’ emphasis on the norm of party control,” where parties are expected to act like lawyers). The
California Judicial Council offers this summary of California appellate cases on unrepresented litigant
assistance:
54

1. The trial judge has broad discretion to adjust procedures to make sure a selfrepresented litigant is heard; 2. Judges will always be affirmed if they make these
adjustments without prejudicing the rights of the opposing party to have the case
decided on the facts and the law. 3. Judges will usually be affirmed if they refuse to
make a specific adjustment, unless such refusal is manifestly unreasonable and unfair.
JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 3–12 (2019).
57 Id.
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the Conference of Chief Justices, state supreme courts, judicial leaders, 58 legal scholars,
and think-tanks such as the National Center for State Courts and the Self-Represented
Litigation Network. 59 Over the past few decades, such sources have issued a range of
articles, reports, bench guides, and training materials that recommend and define an
accommodating, helpful, and interventionist role for judges in lawyerless courts.
This section reviews existing guidance and draws out two cross-cutting
recommendations for how judges should alter traditional passivity and adversary
procedures in pro se hearings. 60 First, guidance materials instruct judges to offer
information and explanations to help pro se litigants understand the law, court process,
and legal terms. Second, guidance emphasizes a judge’s role in ensuring parties have
their matters fairly and fully heard and urges judges to actively elicit factual information
during hearings to develop a complete record.

See e.g., CIV. JUST. IMPROVEMENTS COMM., CONF. OF CHIEF JUDGES’, CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING
CIVIL
JUSTICE
FOR
ALL
16–18,
34
(2016),
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cji-report.pdf; JUD. COUNCIL OF
CAL., supra note 56; MONT. JUDGES’ DESKBOOK FOR MUN., JUST., & CITY CTS. 5 (John H. Duehr, ed.,
2010); COMM. ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION, NEB. SUP. CT., STRATEGIC PLAN 2015–2020, at
11 (2015); N.M. JUD. EDUC. CTR., UNIV. N.M. SCH. LAW, N.M. JUD. ETHICS HANDBOOK 49 (2011);
MICH. BENCHBOOK (2020); MICH. JUD. INST., CIV. PROC. BENCHBOOK (2d ed., 2020); ACCESS TO JUST.
COMM’N, TENN. SUP. CT., MEETING CHALLENGES OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: A BENCH
BOOK FOR GEN. SESSIONS JUDGES’ OF ST. OF TENN. 2, 6–12 (2013); BENCHBOOK COMM., ASS’N DIST.
CT. JUDGES’ VA., DIST. CT. JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK 159–165 (2019); ADVISORY GRP. SELFREPRESENTATION N.J. COURTS, ENSURING AN OPEN DOOR TO JUSTICE: SOLUTIONS FOR
ENHANCING ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 14, 31, 53–54 (2009);
COLO. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, JUST. CRISIS IN COLO. 2014: REPORT ON CIV. LEGAL NEEDS IN
COLO. 26 (2014); KATHERINE ALTENEDER, EDUARDO GONZALES & FLA. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO
CIV. JUST., LEARNING FROM SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND THEIR TRUSTED INTERMEDIARIES
10–11 (2020); ILL. JUD. BRANCH, BENCH CARD: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS & SCR 63(A)(4)
(2019); MASS., JUD. GUIDELINES FOR CIV. HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS
(WITH COMMENTARY) 1–3 (2019).
59 See e.g., SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES IN COURT-BASED PROGRAMS FOR
THE SELF-REPRESENTED: CONCEPTS, ATTRIBUTES, ISSUES FOR EXPLORATION, EXAMPLES,
CONTACTS, AND RESOURCES (2D ED. 2008) [hereinafter SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST
PRACTICES]; JOHN M. GREACEN & MICHAEL HOULBERG, ENSURING RIGHT TO BE HEARD:
GUIDANCE FOR TRIAL JUDGES IN CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2019); JUSTICE
FOR ALL MATERIALS, supra note 12. The Self-Represented Litigation Network, the National Center for
State Courts, and the American Judicature Society collaborated to develop curricula to train judges in
best practices for handled pro se cases. See Nat’l. Ctr. St. Cts., Curriculum: Access to Justice for the SelfRepresented, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK (2013), https://www.srln.org/node/202/judicialcurricula-access-justice-self-represented [hereinafter 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice]; see also
Curricula on Access to Justice for the Self-Represented at the Access to Justice for the Self-Represented
Conference at Harvard Law School, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK (Nov. 2007),
https://www.srln.org/node/201/2007-harvard-judicial-leadership-conference
[hereinafter
2007
Curricula].
60 See Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 4 (reviewing guidance and identifying a range
of possible judicial behavior, including explaining, eliciting, adjusting procedures, referring to litigants
to resources, and facilitating negotiation); Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13 (discussing
judges adjusting procedures and raising legal issues); Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra
note 13 (discussing eliciting, explaining, and adjusting procedures).
58
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1. Offering Information and Explanations
According to guidance literature, one of the most important roles a judge plays
in cases without lawyers involves promoting transparency through informationsharing and explanations. 61 The need for explanations is obvious from the perspective
of an unrepresented person: most people do not have legal training and likely will not
know what facts might be relevant, what legal claims they can assert, how to introduce
evidence, or the procedural posture of a case. 62 In addition, as guidance from
California notes, legal language is a “foreign language” for most people. 63
From a court or judge’s perspective, guidance materials offer three common
reasons why judges should serve in an explanatory role. First, a litigant who
understands the legal standards, procedural steps, and court processes will, in turn, be
more helpful to the judge, for example, by offering facts that actually help the judge
render a decision. Second, psychological research on the concept of procedural justice
research suggests parties who believe they understand the reasons for a judge’s
decisions will be more likely to accept and follow those decisions. 64 And third, a
number of guidance sources stress that courts, as institutions, should be articulating
the reasons for their decisions systematically to the people who bring their problems
to courts for resolution, a principle also rooted in procedural justice research, which

61 See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13, at 931; Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice,
supra note 13, at 660–70; see e.g., ILL. JUD. BRANCH, BENCH CARD, supra note 58, at 1; 2013 Curriculum
on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module D; JUSTICE FOR ALL MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 32;
Richard Zorza, A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications of Turner v. Rogers, 4 JUDGES’
J. 16, 17–18 (2011) [hereinafter Zorza, A New Day]; GREACEN & HOULBERG, supra note 59, at 14; JUD.
COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at 2–3; COLO. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, JUSTICE CRISIS, supra note
58.

Throughout the process, the judge should have in place proactive processes to make
sure that the parties do understand what is going on and why. This should include
asking if they understand, and seeking confirmation of understanding at critical
points.
Zorza, The Disconnect, supra note 24, at 443. For a robust discussion of how people without lawyers
engage with legal information, see generally, David J. Greiner, Dalie Jimenez, and Lois Lupica, Self-Help
Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119 (2017).
62 See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module A, slide 4.
63 JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at x, 4. In fact, California’s guide notes that legal terms are,
quite literally, sometimes a “mash-up” of foreign languages including Latin and French.
64 Id. at 6–19 (“Judges have wide discretion to admit or reject evidence in cases involving selfrepresented litigants, but should explain their thought process to the parties to maintain a sense of
fairness.”). As a number of sources note, research suggests that perceptions of a decisionmaker’s
trustworthiness are directly tied to whether a judge can justify, via explanation, the decisions she makes.
See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module A, slide 15; see also Tom Tyler,
Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCH. 117, 122 (2010); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW (2006).
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suggests that people are more likely to perceive courts and their decisions as legitimate
when they understand the bases of those decisions. 65
With these goals in mind, guidance pushes judges to take responsibility for
explaining a wide range of information and confirming that litigants actually
understand the information the judge has attempted to convey. 66 Judges are
encouraged to offer clear, accessible explanations of court processes and procedures,
such as the order of trial or how evidence should be offered, legal information, like
what elements must be proven in a case, and language, including translating legal terms
and avoiding the use of jargon in the first place. 67
Guidance materials suggest judges offer information at the beginning of a
docket to explain the process litigants can expect, such as why certain cases will be
heard first. 68 Judges are also encouraged to begin every hearing with a brief statement
of the purpose of the hearing, the process that will be followed, and the legal issues
that will be heard or decided. 69 During hearings, judges are instructed to explain the
applicable law or legal standards when needed and offer sufficient explanations to help
litigants understand what kind of factual information the court needs to render a
decision, such as explaining why a judge might need testimony on an issue. 70 At the
end of hearings, judges are urged to explain the content, meaning, and enforcement
process of court orders. 71
2. Fully Developing the Factual Record
According to guidance materials, judges should actively elicit facts from
litigants to ensure a complete factual record, accurate legal decisions, and the
perception, on the part of litigants, that they have been heard by the court. 72
Recommended eliciting behavior includes asking “neutral” questions to develop facts,
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 59; GREACEN & HOULBERG,
supra note 59.
66 For examples, see Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction,
44 CT. REV. 4, 18 (2007) [hereinafter Burke & Leben, Procedural Fairness]; 2013 Curriculum on Access to
Justice, Supra note 59, at Module A, slide 7.
67 See e.g., SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES supra note 59, at 54.
68 Id. at 54.
69 See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module B, slide 6.
70 SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 59, at 54; JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL.,
supra note 56, at 2–7.
71 For examples, see e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 59, at 8 (“At the hearing, the judge grants
[the] emergency protective order and explains the consequences of it as well as possible next steps [the
litigant] might take to ensure her family’s safety.”); Burke & Leben, Procedural Fairness, supra note 66, at
18.
72 See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module B, slide 8; JUD. COUNCIL OF
CAL., supra note 56, at 50–53; ILL. JUD. BRANCH, BENCH CARD, supra note 58; MASS., JUDICIAL
GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, supra note 58; COLO.
ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, JUSTICE CRISIS, supra note 58.
65
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listening patiently to narrative testimony, modifying evidentiary and procedural rules
to ensure relevant evidence is introduced. 73 Pro se guidance stresses the importance of
this role for an obvious reason: judges need legally relevant facts to render decisions.
Getting such information in hearings involving unrepresented people is a persistent
challenge, given that litigants may have only a loose sense of what matters under the
law and a strong sense of what matters in their own lives.
State courts systems tend to offer general guidance that judges may ask
questions and adjust hearing procedures to elicit information but vary in the strength
of their recommendations that judges actively intervene. Montana and California
exemplify two approaches. Official guidance in Montana pushes judges to intervene
as little as possible, stepping in only when necessary to clarify testimony, while
California encourages judges actively to elicit information and ask questions. 74
Guidance language encouraging judges to help litigants develop the factual
record is typically stated in broad terms. 75 For example, one judicial training curriculum
See e.g. MASS., JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS, supra note 58; 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module A, slide 7;
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 59, at 54, 59; Zorza, A New Day,
supra note 61, at 17–18; GREACEN & HOULBERG, supra note 59, at 14.
73

To decide cases fairly, judges need facts, and to get those facts, judges often have to
ask questions, modify procedure, and apply their common sense in the courtroom
to create an environment in which all the relevant facts are brought out. Without a
full understanding of the facts, judicial officers are at risk to either mis-apply the
applicable law or apply the wrong law.
JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at 2-2.
See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56; MONT. JUDGES’ DESKBOOK, supra note 58.
75 The following language comes from a two-page “Bench Card” from Illinois. The document offers a
paragraph expanding on each of the points below:
74

Tips for ensuring SRLs are fairly heard: 1. Use simple, plain language; avoid legal
jargon; and explain legal concepts. 2. Explain overall court processes (including
evidentiary and foundational requirements) and what will happen in court. 3. Ask the
SRL what questions they have and check for understanding throughout proceedings.
4. Liberally construe pleadings: look to the substance of a pleading rather than its
title.5. Ask neutral questions for clarification or to focus the proceedings and
consider modifying the traditional order of taking evidence.6. Explain why you are
doing something and your basis for rulings. 7. Recognize that most SRLs may be
scared and nervous.8. Be courteous, patient, and an active listener to ease tension. 9.
Remember procedural fairness principles: voice, neutrality, respect, trust,
understanding, and helpfulness. 10. Appreciate your unconscious biases and increase
cultural competencies. 11. Use certified interpreters for limited English proficient or
hearing impaired litigants. 12. Provide SRLs with checklists, handouts, and other
resources or referrals.
ILL. JUD. BRANCH, BENCH CARD, supra note 58.
A statewide guide to handling pro se cases developed by the Judicial Council of California and released
in 2019 is an exception and stands out among all the guidance documents we reviewed as by far the
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urges judges to “…focus on what the litigants need,” which typically is “a process in
which they feel the courts are engaged and in which they can tell their stories
in meaningful ways.” 76 The curriculum goes on to say, “Active listening by the court
assists in building the confidence of the litigants and permits the court to guide the
proceedings without the litigants feeling frustrated by being limited in their
presentations.” 77 Most guidance materials steer clear of offering granular protocols,
substantive legal context, or step-by-step recommendations. 78
Yet, all of this guidance is merely advisory. Absent more detailed, contextspecific advice or clear legal standards, let alone an affirmative obligation to assist pro
se litigants in some way, individual judges ultimately have vast responsibility and
discretion in operationalizing reforms to the traditional, passive role. In fact, many
guidance sources explicitly note judges’ vast discretion in determining how best to
interact with unrepresented people, and some even take pains to assure judges that
they can reject any suggestions that make them “uncomfortable.” 79 Some sources seem
to acknowledge where recommendations will inevitably fall short. For example, one
judicial training curriculum presents “Ten Key Techniques” for pro se cases, but before
listing the techniques, includes this caveat:
Every case is different, and every litigant is different. In a particular
case, some techniques may apply, some may not, and others may need
modifying….The techniques are offered as tools to judges, not explicit
directions. Every judge has to develop his or her style. 80

most comprehensive and detailed, clocking in at 280 pages. The first four chapters address judges’
behavior in evidentiary hearings, one chapter reviews California appellate decisions related to pro se
assistance, another chapter explains the implications of procedural justice research, and another suggests
a range of courtroom and hearing management techniques, including sample scripts for a range of
situations. This guide offers more in-depth information about the challenges pro se litigants face when
compared to other states. It also offers many more concrete steps judges can take, such as check-in
procedures, organizing the order in which cases are called, clustering issues during evidentiary hearings,
outlining which legal issues the court will be deciding in a hearing, and explaining which party has the
burden of proof for each hearing. However, it is an open question whether this level of guidance, absent
formal legal requirements for judges to help pro se litigants, will alter judges’ approach. See JUD. COUNCIL
OF CAL., supra note 56.
76 2007 Curricula, supra note 59, at Curriculum 2, slide 6.
77 Id.
78 California is an exception in offering more detailed guidance. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note
56.
79 See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module B, slide 7, slide 14; JUD.
COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at 2-2.
80 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module B, slide 7. The ten key techniques
are: Frame the subject matter of the hearing. Explain the process that will be followed. Elicit needed
information from litigants. Involve litigants in decision making. Articulate the decision from the bench.
Explain the decision and summarize the terms of the order. Anticipate and resolve issues with
compliance. Provide a written order at the close of the hearing. Set litigant expectations for next steps.
Use nonverbal communication effectively.
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As this section has shown, the backdrop of this study is one of formal law with
general admonitions and limited requirements, informal guidance with more specific
suggestions, and ultimately reliance on individual judicial behavior to improve access
to justice in lawyerless courts. We turn next to the study itself.
II.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This Part describes the study’s research design including methods, data
collection processes, and study sites.
This study was designed to offer the first systematic, theoretically-driven, and
rigorous comparative description of how judges who preside in America’s lawyerless
courts operationalize and conceive of their role, including whether and how they assist
pro se litigants and implement role reform recommendations. 81 We approached this
empirical project by selecting study sites that allowed us to control for the effects of
substantive law while varying other contextual factors. The variation across sites
includes geographical location, political culture, court administrative structure, judicial
ethics rules, availability of pro se training for judges, and other investments in civil
justice infrastructure aimed at increasing access to justice. The three jurisdictions in
the study rank at the top, middle, and bottom of the national Justice Index,
respectively. This approach allowed us to examine environments where the universe
of judicial behavior was constrained by relatively fixed legal structures while the level
of guidance and support for judges actively providing pro se assistance varied. 82
Our methodological approach is informed by the pragmatic tradition of
sociolegal scholarship, which recognizes that studying complex social phenomena
requires researchers to describe and understand the conditions that underlie the
phenomena they wish to study. 83 To engage in this type of research process, we must
diverge from conventional ways of studying judicial behavior in legal scholarship,
which tend to focus on case outcomes, written opinions, and the factors that might
One self-published study by the Self-Represented Litigation Network and John Greacen offers
some data on judicial behavior in pro se family law cases. However, the study design has important
limitations worth noting. For example, the study included only fifteen hearings and the researchers
chose study only courts that had reputations for providing high-levels of assistance to pro se litigants,
see Self-Represented Litigation Network and John Greacen, Effectiveness of Courtroom Communication in
Hearings: An Exploratory Study (2008) available at
https://www.srln.org/system/files/attachments/Effectivenes%20in%20Courtroom%20Communication%20in%20H
earings%20Involving%20Two%20Self-Represented%20Litigants_0.pdf.
82 See John Gerring & Lee Cojocaru, Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals and Methods,
45 SOCIO. METHODS & RSCH. 396, 397 (2016).
83 See ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS (Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc
Mason & Kirsten McConnachie eds., Routledge 2019); Howard S. Erlanger, Bryant Garth, Jane E.
Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse, and David B. Wilkins, Forward: Is it Time for a New Legal
Realism? 2005 WISC. L. REV. 335, 345-346 (2005); Rebecca Sandefur, Access to Justice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON MODERN LEGAL REALISM (Shauhin Talesh, Elizabeth Mertz, and Heinz Klug, eds.,
forthcoming).
81
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shape judges’ decisions in appellate cases. 84 While these existing studies provide
valuable contributions to the scholarly understanding of how judges decide cases in
appeals courts, this methodological approach is not appropriate for studying trial
judges and their courts where written decisions are nearly non-existent, and appeals
are rare. 85 Even if written decisions were widely available, our interest does not lie in
predicting or explaining case outcomes, but instead in examining the myriad withincase decisions judges make that largely go unrecorded. Civil trial courts lack lawyers to
mediate and influence judge behavior, thus judges within-case decisions about role
implementation, procedure, and offering assistance to pro se litigants may be as
important as, or even drive, case outcomes. Understanding how judges are
implementing their role and enforcing procedural rules in civil trials requires capturing
judges’ live, in-person interactions with litigants, including contextual, environmental,
and non-verbal information that a transcript alone, without in-person observation and
collection, could not capture. By collecting these data, we can explore a full range of
judicial behavior in those interactions, including what choices judges make, factors that
might drive their behavior, how those choices affect litigants, and the implications for
court legitimacy and the rule of law.
Given that our research questions focus on examining judicial behavior, we
collected observational data from hearings and interview data and from conversations
with judges. Our study sample – eleven judges across three jurisdictions that vary in
their level of guidance and support for pro se assistance and active judging tactics –
facilitates comparisons of behaviors of interest at the judge and jurisdiction level. 86
The jurisdictions include Centerville, a large, prosperous, coastal urban center;
Townville, a small, economically depressed coastal city; and Plainville, a mid-size city
located in the middle of the country. 87
To focus our comparative efforts, we sought to minimize the influence of
factors that would interfere with our ability to discuss judges’ approaches across
jurisdictions. As such, we chose an area of law that varies relatively little from state to
state in substantive law and process: protective orders for victims of intimate partner
See Katerina Linos & Melissa Carlson, Qualitative Methods for Law Review Writing, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
213 (2017).
85 See Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to
Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1734; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 835 n.17 (2008); Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 3, at 265–
71.
86 For a discussion of this approach, purposive sampling, see John Gerring, Case Selection for Case-Study
Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
METHODOLOGY 645 (Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., New York:
Oxford University Press 2008); Jason Seawright & John Gerring, Case Selection Techniques in Case Study
Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options, 61 POL. RSCH. Q. 294 (2008).
87 To protect the confidentiality of our study sites and research subjects and to comply with Institutional
Review Board requirements, this Article reports no identifying information, including omitting any
identifiable language or direct references to jurisdiction-specific substantive or procedural rules.
84
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abuse and stalking. Further, in this area of law, most parties are unrepresented, and the
cases require in-person testimony. Therefore, we were able to gather data on judges’
in-person interactions with pro se parties in an area of law that affords similar
opportunities for judges to perform recommended behaviors and offer pro se
assistance. We discuss our study site and case selection methods, as well as our
approach to data collection and analysis, in more detail below.
A. THE JURISDICTIONS
The three jurisdictions in our study vary economically, demographically, and
politically. Centerville is a relatively wealthy, politically liberal, and diverse urban center
with appointed judges. Townville is also urban, politically liberal, and diverse, with a
very high poverty rate, a history of economic stagnation and appointed judges.
Plainville is majority white, politically moderate, and sits in a fiscally and socially
conservative state where social and government services of all kinds are under-funded,
including the courts. Most Plainville judges are elected. 88 As illustrated in Table 1, the
jurisdictions also vary in their institutional commitments to, and history of, civil access
to justice reform, including court funding, ethics rules, and guidance and training for
judges. We conducted an independent review of each jurisdiction’s access to justice
reform history and civil justice context, including reviewing primary documents and
aggregating sources. 89 One of the aggregating sources, the Justice Index, regularly
surveys and ranks U.S. states based on the strength of their access to justice reform
efforts. 90 The paragraphs that follow present the results of this review.
Table 1. Jurisdiction-Level Variation in Judges’ Environments
Site

Centerville

Townville

Plainville

Justice
Index
Upper
quartile
(top 25%)
Second
quartile
(25-50%)

Ethics Rules

Guidance

Training

Governance

Permissive &
encouraging

Yes

Yes

Centralized

Permissive

Yes

Yes

Centralized

Lower
quartile
(bottom
25%)

Permissive

No

No

Local control

Some Plainville judges are appointed to limited roles by the elected bench.
As we have noted, to preserve anonymity, we have omitted identifying details, which sometimes
requires us to speak at a level of abstraction about certain issues and prevents us from quoting or citing
law or primary documents directly.
90 Our assessment of each jurisdiction is based on our own original research, as well as aggregating
sources, such as the Justice Index. See JUSTICE INDEX, supra note 22.
88
89
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In the most recent Justice Index report, Centerville sits in the top of national
rankings. The jurisdiction is a recognized national leader in access to justice reform,
including reform of the judicial role. Centerville’s effort to shape the judicial approach
to pro se assistance include changes to the judicial canons, court-issued
recommendations, and regular judge training. Centerville is one of only a handful of
jurisdictions in the country that not only permit “reasonable accommodations” for pro
se litigants and clarify that such accommodations do not violate impartiality but also
offer a list of possible tactics judges may employ. Only a handful of other states have
judicial canons that encourage pro se assistance. As a result, we label Centerville’s
canons “permissive and encouraging.” 91 Centerville’s ethical canons encourage judges
to explain their decisions, court process, and procedural rules. However, this
encouragement is bounded by the suggestion that judges’ explanations should be brief.
The rules also encourage judges to ask questions to elicit facts, alter traditional trial
procedures, and refer litigants to legal services.
Centerville’s court administration has issued additional guidance encouraging
judges to take an active role in assisting pro se litigants. The guidance instructs judges
to ensure litigants have an opportunity to be heard, understand court processes,
decisions, and orders, and are treated with respect. Judges appointed to the bench
receive regular training on handling pro se cases, and in our experience studying civil
courts, receive more training on pro se assistance compared to most judges across the
country. This training includes learning from peer judges. Centerville also has a strong,
unified court administration that exercises significant control over court processes and
logistics, including judicial training and appointments.
According to the Justice Index, Townville falls in the middle of national access
to justice reform rankings. Its judicial canons are merely “permissive” with only the
basic authorization for judges to make reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants,
but without the additional stronger language Centerville and a few other jurisdictions
offer. State court administrators have issued additional advisory materials urging
judges to explain procedures and court orders and make necessary referrals. Judges are
appointed and receive training on handling pro se cases, after initial appointment and
ongoing training for particular court dockets. Townville’s court administration is
strong, particularly compared to localized court control in Plainville.
Our final jurisdiction, Plainville, is in the very bottom of the Justice Index
rankings, having made almost no effort at the time of our study to reform its civil
91 We have labeled each jurisdiction’s canons of judicial conduct. Centerville’s canons are “permissive
and encouraging” because they allow reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants and also offer a
set of possible assistance behaviors judges can engage in. Townville and Plainville have “permissive”
canons because they allow reasonable accommodations but do not offer any additional language in the
canons to encourage pro se assistance.
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justice system or the judicial role in that system in response to the rise of lawyerless
courts. Its judicial canons are only “permissive.” At the time of our study, Plainville’s
access to justice reform efforts consisted of developing standardized forms for some
pro se litigants, including petitioners in protective order cases. As a matter of formal
law at the time, the jurisdiction’s state court administration was silent on the topic of
self-represented parties’ needs beyond the permissive authorization of reasonable
accommodations in ethics rules. There was no statewide guidance for judges in
lawyerless courts at the time of our study, and judges did not receive systematic, courtprovided training on handling pro se cases. In contrast to the other two jurisdictions,
Plainville’s court administration is among the weakest in the country in terms of its
power to influence trial court management. Trial courts are almost totally controlled
at the local level by elected judges who are functionally unaccountable to state court
administration and do not rely on the state to fund local court operations.
In sum, we selected these jurisdictions based on our expectations of finding
significant cross-jurisdictional variation in whether and how judges assist pro se litigants.
In Centerville and Townville, where judges receive training and strong court
administrative bodies have signaled their support for judges offering pro se assistance
beyond merely altering ethics rules to permit such assistance, we expected judges to
behave more consistently with the judicial role reform recommendations we described
in Part I(c). We particularly expected to see more of the recommended pro se assistance
behaviors from judges in Centerville given the jurisdiction’s long history of
investments in access to justice reform, judicial canons that not only permit but also
encourage such assistance, and robust judicial training programs. Our expectations
were much different for Plainville, which lacks statewide guidance and training for
judges and where the canons are merely permissive. We expected Plainville judges
would offer far less help to pro se litigants than either of the other jurisdictions. 92
B. CONSISTENT SUBSTANTIVE LAW
We chose to study judicial behavior in a single area of law – protective orders
for victims of abuse and stalking – because the law is relatively straightforward and
consistent across jurisdictions. Protective order statutes first originated in the 1970’s
and were originally designed as a remedy to protect victims of intimate partner
violence. These laws were a direct response to advocacy by advocates for women, who
initially criticized the police response to domestic violence and sought to have it treated
like any other crime. Later, advocates grew skeptical of a states’ ability to help victims
and successfully advocated for the creation of a civil law remedy that would protect
We also note that, while we are principally seeking to explore the relationship between jurisdictionlevel commitments to civil justice reform and the utilization of active judging tactics, we do not foreclose
the possibility that intra-jurisdictional differences may also inform judges’ behavior. Future studies
would do well to consider how these differences may manifest across a sample of judges that allow for
such subset analyses.
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victims from abuse, empower them to leave dangerous relationships, and most
importantly, give them a measure of autonomy. 93
Protective orders are an area of civil court operations that has seen particularly
robust access to justice reform over the past few decades. Petitioners are the primary
focus of these efforts. 94 For example, in all the jurisdictions we studied, at least one
domestic violence agency works collaboratively with the court to offer a broad menu
of social and legal services, both inside and outside the courthouse. In fact, in all
jurisdictions, domestic violence advocates who worked for or were trained by these
agencies sat in the courtroom during dockets and assisted petitioners.
In addition, these cases almost always involve two unrepresented parties.
Protective orders are a form of injunctive relief, paired with discretionary court fees
and monetary awards, and the potential for criminal enforcement. 95 They offer fairly
robust relief provisions ranging from “no contact” or “stay away” provisions, property
possession, and child custody. 96 In each jurisdiction, the court has developed and made
available a set of court forms, including petitions, draft orders, and returns of service.
And in each jurisdiction, the domestic violence agencies and advocates offer their
services to essentially all petitioners. 97 These providers help people decide whether to
pursue a protective order, offer legal advice and information, and assist in completing
and filing all necessary forms. Notably, protective orders are an area of law with robust
services for petitioners and essentially no services for defendants. In all three
jurisdictions, petitioners file form pleadings with the court, but defendants do not.
Instead, in these summary proceedings, a defendant’s only opportunity to respond
happens live, in-court, during a hearing on the merits.
In protective order cases, the core question is typically whether the defendant
engaged in a particular behavior targeted toward the petitioner that either harmed the
petitioner directly or threatened harm. In most jurisdictions, there is some sort of
relationship test, usually looking at whether the parties are related through a dating
relationship, marriage, or blood. Protective orders are also available for victims of
stalking.
See Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State's Response to Domestic Violence: Past Victories and Future Challenges,
1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 127, 127–8 (1999); Jane Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice 39 HARV. J. GENDER
& L. 189, 194; Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer-Do We Know That for Sure: Questioning the Efficacy of
Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 7, 18 (2004).
94 This is largely driven by the 1994 initial enactment, subsequent revisions, and related funding of the
Violence Against Women Act.
95 Stoever, supra note 93, at 199.
96 Id.
97 For a fuller discussion of findings about the role of domestic violence advocates in our study,
including the relationship between these advocates’ work and deregulation of the legal profession and
practice of law, see Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Judges
and Deregulation of the Lawyers’ Monopoly, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 1315 (2021) [hereinafter Judges and
Deregulation].
93
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C. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
We observed approximately 200 hours of live court proceedings across the
three sites. These proceedings include 357 protective order hearings involving at least
one person without counsel. While in court, the research team took verbatim notes on
everything judges and litigants said. 98 Wherever possible, we made notes about the
court environment beyond the case being heard at any given moment and recorded
exchanges we heard and things we saw around the courtroom, including interactions
involving litigants in the audience, court clerks, domestic violence advocates, law
students, and bailiffs, to name a few. We also conducted semi-structured interviews
with the judges in Centerville and Plainville, which tapped the justifications and
processes underlying the behavior we observed in the courtroom and included
questions about the proper role of judge and how that role has evolved and adapted
to accommodate a majority pro se docket.
Due to the dearth of empirical scholarship and grounded theory development
on trial judge behavior in state civil courts, we recognized that we needed to account
for emergent themes and phenomena. For example, at the beginning of data collection,
we anticipated we would code a category of judicial behavior as “eliciting” when judges
asked questions to elicit testimony. During observations, it became clear that the
category was not sufficiently nuanced—there were two distinct forms of eliciting,
leading and non-leading. This difference, as we explain in Part III, has important
consequences for how we think about alternative applications of eliciting and their
respective impacts on the development of the factual record.
After we completed data collection, we converted our raw observation and
interview notes to text files and used a qualitative coding platform, ATLAS.ti, for
thematic analyses. Based on our review of existing literature and recommendations for
judicial role reform, we then followed a theoretically informed qualitative coding

98 We sought and received Institutional Review Board approval to conduct this study (Protocol 17-28),
which was found to be exempt. Throughout our data collection and analysis process, including drafting
this Article, we seek to preserve the confidentiality of our study sites. We sought permission to conduct
court observations and interviews and were able to observe all judges working in each jurisdiction at
time of data collection, including five judges in Centerville, four in Townville, and two in Plainville. Of
these, two judges in Centerville and two in Plainville consented to be interviewed. Unfortunately, none
of the judges in Townville consented to an interview. Judge and court resistance to our research existed
in different ways as we conducted our research. In Townville, though individual judges directly
expressed varied willingness to be interviewed and some spoke “unofficially” to researchers, the
administrative judge of the court instructed all of the observed judges that they may not be officially
interviewed. In addition, a fourth jurisdiction was originally intended to be a site of research and while
an individual judge welcomed observation and interview, the administrative judge of the relevant docket
refused to allow either. Despite clear law in the jurisdiction that the court could not prohibit
observation, we decided not to pursue data collection in that jurisdiction. In any situation where a case
was called and at least one party was present and had an interaction with a judge, we counted it as a
hearing.
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protocol and analysis process. 99 All researchers reviewed the raw data files across study
sites and identified a range of potential codes and broader themes. The researchers
shared their initial codes and themes and refined them through an iterative process.
Next, the full dataset was coded by one researcher for evidence of the utilization of
the active judging tactics and the emergent nuances therein, beginning with our court
observation field notes, followed by the interview data. In this process, we coded for
both judicial behaviors that appeared in hearing transcripts and for the explanations
judges gave about their approach during interviews. Through this process, we also
recognized the importance of capturing missed opportunities for judges to assist pro se
litigants, as well as of identifying mismatches between a judge’s expressed interests and
her courtroom behaviors. For example, in interviews, judges identified fairness as a
principle guiding their work. During hearing observations, we identified opportunities
for judges to advance that principle that were missed through their refusal to answer
basic questions from litigants and their use of jargon. We contend that these missed
or even overtly rejected opportunities have important consequences for substantive
and procedural justice.
III.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents and discusses results from our comparative data about
state civil trial court judges in lawyerless courts. This exploration includes whether and
how judges have altered the traditional judicial role to assist pro se litigants in hearings.
As we showed in Part I, scholars and access to justice reformers have painted a hopeful
vision for judicial role reform as a meaningful access to justice solution while courts
and access to justice think-tanks have developed and disseminated guidance and best
practices. But as we have also shown, while law generally permits pro se assistance from
judges, formal law on the scope and nature of such assistance remains vague and leaves
individual judges with discretion and responsibility to decide whether and how to assist
people without counsel.
We expected to find cross-jurisdictional variation in judges’ behavior given
differences in geographic location, demographics, judicial ethics and training, courts’
administrative structure, and approach to access to justice reform more broadly, as we
described in Part II. For example, we anticipated that judges in Centerville, where
judicial canons permit and encourage pro se assistance and judges receive regular
training, would offer more assistance and hew more closely to recommended
interventions than judges in Plainville, a jurisdiction that had done almost nothing to
promote judicial role reform at the time of our data collection.

See Jennifer Fereday & Eimear Muir-Cochrane, Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid
Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development, 5 INT’L J. QUALITATIVE METHODS 1, 4
(2006).
99
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Our primary finding is surprising – we did not observe meaningful variation
across judges or jurisdictions. All judges in the sample approached handling pro se
hearings in similar ways and consistently offered little assistance to pro se litigants.
Instead, they maintained legal and procedural complexity in their courtrooms and
tightly controlled the presentation of evidence during hearings, sometimes to the point
of shutting down litigants’ attempts to present information. The judges in our sample
had clearly set aside most aspects of judicial passivity—they do not sit back and simply
allow parties to attempt to present their cases. Yet, their actions did not reflect the
reform vision of judges who offer a range of assistance to litigants in lawyerless courts.
Our court observation data show two categories of similar behavior. First,
judges rarely explained court processes, legal concepts, and language as advocates for
role reform have widely recommended. Instead, they used legal jargon consistently,
often refused to answer litigants’ questions, and sometimes criticized litigants for
asking questions or expressing confusion. Second, in contrast to the vision of a judge
who listens patiently to narrative testimony and asks questions to gather as much
information as possible, we show how judges tightly controlled the presentation of
evidence and prevented parties from offering narratives or shaping the order and
substance of their testimony. Judges also leaned heavily on one party’s pleading, the
petition, to guide their questioning.
A. JUDGES’ SIMILAR COURTROOM BEHAVIOR
a. Maintaining Legal and Procedural Complexity
Across our observations, judges exercised process control and wielded legal
jargon in ways that maintained legal and procedural complexity in their courtrooms.
Although the explanatory, information sharing function of the pro se judge is a pillar of
the reform vision articulated by scholars, court guidance, and access to justice
advocates, it was uncommon in our data.
Rather than offering accessible, plain-language explanations to individual
litigants and regularly checking in to confirm understanding as guidance recommends,
we rarely observed judges offering information about substantive law, procedures, or
legal terms beyond prepared, general opening speeches for the entire courtroom.
When we did observe judges giving explanations, the explanations were brief and
judges consistently used legal jargon rather than accessible language. When parties
asked questions or sought explanations, judges often refused to answer. In some
extreme examples, we observed seemingly frustrated judges criticizing or mocking
litigants for their lack of legal expertise.
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i.

Opening Speeches

Judges consistently across our study jurisdictions began the court session with
brief opening speeches to the entire courtroom. In some cases, judges gave live
speeches. In others, the speeches were pre-recorded. Opening speeches had an
efficient, check-the-box quality, consistent with some judges telling us they worked
from a script received in training. In most hearings, judges did not repeat their opening
speeches although court sessions involved multiple cases and many minutes or hours
may have passed between the speech and a party’s case being called.
Inevitably, some litigants were not present in the courtroom during opening
speeches. In the busy, full courtrooms we observed, parties sometimes arrived late or
moved in and out of the courtroom. Despite this, the judges seemed to assume that
one opening speech was sufficient to convey the desired information to every litigant.
For example, Plainville Judge 1’s opening speech emphasized how she
expected litigants to behave in the courtroom and did not explain legal or procedural
issues other than noting that a protective order comes with a $200 fine and a firearms
prohibition. These are just two of many possible consequences of a protective order,
such as loss of physical liberty for the defendant. In her opening speech, Plainville
Judge 1 did not actually describe what a protective order is, whether functionally or as
a matter of law, and did not mention that criminal charges can result from a violation
of an order:
I’ll call cases in order they are listed. When I call your case, please stand,
stay where you are, and remain standing until I address you. I’ll ask
plaintiffs if they want to proceed and are ready to proceed. For
defendants, I’ll ask if you object. If you object, we will need to have a
hearing. If defendants don’t object or if we have a hearing, there’s a
court fee of about $200 if there’s a permanent protective order, and
there is a prohibition on having firearms. There’s a federal law. So there
are consequences to a protective order. This is a court of law, so there
should be no eyerolling, no gestures to the opposing party. I expect
and demand civility for everyone. We have resources for both parties
in the courtroom. Representatives from [a domestic violence agency]
are here to help you with resources or services.
In the example above, which varied little from day-to-day, the judge opens by stating
she will call cases in the “order they are listed.” However, litigants did not have access
to a list of cases and thus had no way to know when their case would be called. In our
observations, some litigants waited up to an hour or more for the judge to call their
case.
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The judge also refers litigants to “representatives” from a domestic violence
agency. Two of the agency’s staff were always seated at the front of the courtroom
near the judge’s dais. Despite this, the judge’s general referral to these advocates was
both substantively inaccurate and impossible for most litigants to operationalize
without more specific guidance. The referral is inaccurate because the judge states that
the agency can “help everyone,” but the agency primarily serves petitioners and does
not serve parties on two sides of the same case. Functionally, litigants had almost no
way to access or communicate with the domestic violence agency staff given where
they were seated in the courtroom. A person who wanted to speak to one of the agency
staff would have to walk up to the front of the courtroom in full view of everyone and
pass directly in front of the judge and any litigants whose cases were being heard.
Unsurprisingly, litigants generally did not approach the domestic violence agency staff
during docket calls. 100
In Townville, judges’ opening speeches focused on describing the legal and
procedural framework of protective order cases. In these speeches, judges consistently
used technical, inaccessible language. Townville judges’ opening speeches usually
included a vague reference to the controlling statute (“the Act”) and legal jargon about
the standard of proof, as in this example from Townville Judge 1:
Today, domestic violence cases will be heard. I will decide whether to
issue a protective order where there has been an act of domestic
violence. The applicable relationships are defined by the Act. This is a
civil court. First, we apply the civil standard of proof, which is a
preponderance of the evidence, not the criminal standard of proof,
beyond a reasonable doubt. Preponderance of the evidence just means
more likely than not…
Additional language from Townville judges’ opening speeches included a robust
warning about various civil and criminal consequences of a protective order.
Unfortunately, like the statement above, the speech was rife with additional jargon,
such as, “The defendant may stipulate to the complaint and the court will issue a
protective order.” Notably, each of the Townville judges used close variations of a
statement provided to judges in their initial training program.

100 As we describe in greater detail in another article based on this study, Plainville Judge 1 consistently
relied on advocates to give petitioners information and guidance after she had called their case,
particularly in cases with no service on the defendant. In these instances, the judge relied on advocates
to affirmatively walk up to petitioners or point them in the right direction. This is the main way that we
saw litigants make a connection with the advocates, as opposed to litigants seeking the advocates out
without prompting. See Steinberg, Carpenter, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 97.
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ii.

Rare Explanations and Jargon

Judicial role reform guidance emphasizes that the language of law and courts
is unfamiliar for unrepresented people and urges judges to explain law, procedure, and
language throughout the litigation process. In interviews, most of the judges in our
study discussed the importance of offering information. But in court observations,
explanations were rare. Outside of the routine opening speeches described above,
judges typically offered litigants only the most limited explanations, commonly used
legal jargon, and often seemed to ignore or dismiss litigants’ obvious confusion.
The following is a small sample of the jargon and technical terms we observed:
Centerville Judge 1:
Judge: When she files a protective order, the judge listens and if she
makes a prima facie case, the judge issues it.
___
Judge: You have the burden of proof. Provide me with the factual
predicate for the relief you seek in this case. So, what happened and
when, how it affected you, and what relief you’re seeking.
Centerville Judge 2:
Judge: The defendant can file a motion to set aside the default, but just
filing the motion doesn’t automatically set it aside.
___
Petitioner: My son was present when [the defendant] choked me. What
is the appropriate age to be a witness? He’s nine.
Judge: The Court will do voir dire to determine if the child knows the
difference between truth and a lie and is competent.
___
Judge: You may file a motion to set aside stating your reason for not
appearing and meritorious defenses or reasons the court should vacate
the order. That’s it you’ve been served; you are free to go.
Defendant: So, now do I do the motion?
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Judge: No, you have to file that.
Defendant: She told me to come down and ask and say I had filled out
the paper, but it was wrong.
Judge: If you filed something today it will be calendared by the clerk’s
office, not today.
Defendant: She also told me that I should tell you I never received
anything.
Judge: Well, if you have grounds to vacate the judgment, you need to
file a motion. We have a full calendar.
Plainville Judge 1
Judge: So, you object because these are different days? So, you’re telling
me this is not relevant?
Townville Judge 1
Judge: This is a court of limited jurisdiction.
___
Judge: This is not criminal court. It’s civil. So, the standard is
preponderance of the evidence, not reasonable doubt.
A longer example from Townville Judge 4 further illustrates judges’ lack of
explanations and use of jargon. In the excerpt, the judge makes a procedural decision
without explanation in the face of an unrepresented defendant’s clear attempt to
advocate for himself by making an argument against admitting a photograph. In
response, the judge seems to express frustration, uses jargon, and then simply admits
the evidence without acknowledging the defendant’s argument:
Judge: [To Defendant] Do you object [to these photographs being
introduced]?
Defendant: Yes.
Judge: On what basis? [The Judge does not give the defendant time to
respond before turning to the petitioner, who offered the evidence,
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and asking:] Do these photographs accurately reflect the condition of
you?
Petitioner: Yes.
Judge: [To the defendant] Why do you object?
Defendant: On May 13th, I did not touch her.
Judge: [Sounding frustrated] No, no. The photo. That’s not the
question. She’s saying they show her condition. The question is are
they admissible.
Defendant: She said November 2016. She’s talking about May.
Judge: [Ignores the defendant and turns to the clerk] That should be
marked as Petitioners #1.
We observed that even when judges seemed to make more significant attempts
to offer information and explanations, they still consistently fell back on using
technical language. In the next excerpt, Centerville Judge 1 offers an explanation about
protective order trial process to an unrepresented petitioner who is facing a lawyer on
the other side of the case:
Judge: This is a trial. You have the burden of proving your case under
the [formal name of state statute] and you have to do so by what’s
called a preponderance of the evidence, which means more than fiftyfifty. So, you tell me what happened to you. Why do you think it
[violates the law]? Then the defendant will get a chance to present his
case through cross-examination or just explaining his version of what
happened. And I will hear brief closing arguments if either party has
them. Begin when you’re ready.
Petitioner: Ok, I am not a lawyer, so I don’t know all the things that
they may know [laughs nervously].
Judges’ explanations about the process of a trial tended to follow the pattern
in the excerpt above. Judges would name the component parts of the trial process but
without defining terms or explaining the legal standard and the type of facts that might
be relevant.
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iii.

Refusing to Explain

In interviews, most judges expressed awareness and empathy regarding how
little the average person who appears in court knows about law and litigation
processes. For example, Centerville Judge 2 spoke of litigants’ general reluctance to
ask questions and talked about the human tendency to be embarrassed when
expressing what we do not know.
Pro se litigants often act like they know the law or the procedures, and
they do not. They are embarrassed to say they don’t know what is going
on, or for example a word you use. They won’t ask what it
means…maybe not every judge wants to explain things. In my
experience it is just worth the time to explain it. One who works with
pro se litigants has to be very, very patient…I try to explain how my
courtroom operates. I try to give the lay of the land…I think you want
it to be fair, particularly if one side is represented. It’s not that you’re
helping them win, but you’re explaining things slowly and carefully.
Unfortunately, we observed that when litigants did find the courage to ask
questions, judges most often explicitly refused to answer. Litigants asked judges to
define terms, explain court processes, or explain legal standards. Judges most often
responded to litigants’ questions by, at a minimum, ignoring the question or, at worst,
criticizing the litigant for asking the question.
Different phrases in the vein of “I’m not your lawyer” were a common refrain
in Centerville and Townville, in particular. We also observed numerous examples of
judges saying things like, “I can’t try this case for you” or “I can’t be your attorney,
buddy.” Such phrases were often followed by an admonition to get a lawyer’s advice,
something that is far outside the financial ability of most litigants. To our dismay, we
observed that judges employed such dismissive statements when litigants appeared to
be struggling the most to understand a legal concept, term, or procedural step.
In the example below, Centerville Judge 2 ridicules a defendant for not
knowing a legal term and rebuffs his questions about the terms of a court order. This
case involved a represented petitioner and an unrepresented, incarcerated defendant:
Judge: [To defendant] You heard the [request for a continuance from
petitioner’s counsel]. Do you oppose it?
Defendant: No, I am fine going ahead with that.
Judge: Are you saying you are consenting to the [protective order]?
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Defendant: No, no. I am just not sure what you mean when you say
oppose.
Judge: Are you seriously telling me you don’t know what the word
“oppose” means?
Defendant: Yes ma’am, I am sorry.
Judge: Oppose means you are against it.
Defendant: Oh, no, I am not against it. We can do it when she wants
to.
Judge: So, that’s with consent of Defendant… just make sure you have
vacated the residence.
Defendant: What? Where did that come from?
Judge: This order has been in effect since October 26th.
Defendant: Well, how can I vacate the residence if I am in jail?
Judge: You were served with it. Did you read the order?
Defendant: That just doesn’t make sense. So, you are telling me I can’t
talk to my mother?
Judge: That’s all in the order.
Defendant: I never had the order read to me. I am not sure why I am
even in jail. I haven’t been able to cut my hair in jail. I am embarrassed
to be outside like this.
In another example, Townville Judge 1 is attempting to reschedule a hearing.
In the process, the judge faces a series of questions from both parties. Some questions
are related to the case while some are not. The judge resists offering information, even
when the defendant asks about terms of the court’s temporary order and seemingly
does not know what document to review to find those terms. Instead, the judge refers
the defendant to an attorney:
Judge: How do you want to proceed?
Defendant: I don’t want to lose seeing my kids or my job.
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Judge: Do you want an attorney?
Defendant: I guess.
Judge: I will postpone to a date certain. With or without an attorney,
we will try the case. The protective order is in full effect until then.
Judge: [To petitioner] Do you have anything to add?
Petitioner: I’m sorry about the phone earlier.
Judge: It’s okay.
Petitioner: I want to say that when I filed for a temporary protective
order I was revictimized by the hearing officer, [name]. I want a
permanent protective order until I’m confident about lifting it. I’m
okay with sharing custody. I want to fire my attorney [the petitioner
mentions having an attorney, but there was no attorney present in
court during this hearing].
Judge: I’ll break it down. I can’t make it permanent until a trial. If it’s
granted, there’s always a way for you to lift it.
Petitioner: That’s what I want.
Judge: That’s what the hearing is about. I don’t get involved with your
attorney. You can do what you want in two weeks. We’ll deal with
custody at the hearing.
Defendant: Can you explain what you said? A lot just happened.
Judge: She wants an order until she feels safe.
Defendant: I don’t want to lose the kids.
Judge: So, you have time to talk to an attorney. Whether you hire an
attorney or not, I can’t explain things. I can’t give legal advice.
Defendant: I’m not a bad guy.
Judge: I don’t judge good guy or bad guy. I judge the facts. Talk to a
lawyer before the hearing in two weeks.
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Defendant: Can I see the kids?
Judge: It’s in the temporary order.
Defendant: Which one?
Judge: It says “Friday supervised.”
Petitioner: It was modified.
Judge: What is it?
Petitioner: Supervised in his home on weekends, with curbside pickup.
And they can’t be with their granddad until there’s a psych eval or a
hearing.
Defendant: I’m confused. We were going to do something with
holidays.
Petitioner: Can I speak to that? I’m firing my attorney because I was
revictimized and got bad information. I was told by attorney and
hearing officer that the case would be beat because I didn’t have
pictures of the harm he did and that the protective order would be
lifted and not extended.
Judge: I know here at the beginning when we said we’re having a
trial…I won’t comment on what the attorney and hearing officer said.
I hear the evidence and decide. I will give you two weeks and you can
get an attorney.
Defendant: If I have supervised visits, how does she drop them off?
Judge: Curbside. She drops the kids at the curb. The 8-year-old takes
the 5-year-old to the front door. You don’t come out.
Petitioner: My concern is not [defendant] and the kids. My concern is
[defendant] and me.
Judge: Right. The final protective order will consider the kids interests
and that parents are involved.
Petitioner: It’s just me. Everything is in place.
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Defendant: I don’t want to lose my job and my kids.
Judge: We are adjourned.
A final example of judges’ resistance to offering explanations involves
Townville Judge 2 and an incarcerated defendant. During the hearing, the petitioner
mentions another case she has with the defendant and states there will be a hearing in
that case later in the week. The incarcerated defendant then asks how he can get to the
hearing. The judge responds: “That’s not my concern.” A moment later, the defendant
asks, “What am I in jail for?” The judge responds, “I didn’t arrest you. I don’t know.”
Moments later, the defendant was removed from the courtroom by law enforcement.
In contrast to the reform vision of a helpful judge who carefully explains law,
process, and the language of the courtroom for people without legal training, the
proceedings we observed lacked transparency and judges’ behavior upheld court
complexity. Rather than offering information or explanations, all judges in our sample
consistently controlled and limited access to information, used legal jargon, and
resisted direct questions. Occasionally, seemingly frustrated judges criticized litigants
for asking questions and exhibiting lack of knowledge about the legal system. In these
ways, judicial behavior kept the dockets we observed lawyer-centric as opposed to pro
se friendly.
b. Controlling and Constraining Evidence Presentation
In lawyerless courts, getting facts on the record inevitably requires deviations
from traditional witness examination and evidence presentation—including narrative
testimony and questioning by the judge, given that there are no lawyers to run the
evidence presentation process. Guidance materials suggest judges should allow parties
to offer narrative testimony, listen patiently, and ask neutral, non-leading questions.
While we found that all judges engaged in eliciting, the way they elicited information
was in sharp contrast to guidance. In the hearings we observed, judges tightly
controlled and constrained evidence presentation in two ways. First, judges’ approach
was ultimately imbalanced in favor of petitioners because they relied heavily on the
facts and legal claims contained in petitioners’ pleadings to drive their questions.
Second, judges consistently used a leading questioning style to develop facts and legal
issues and constrained the amount of information parties were allowed to present,
particularly defendants.
i.

Relying on the Petition

In the protective order cases we observed, only one party makes legal and
factual claims through pleadings—the petitioner, through standardized court forms.
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We found that these petitions played a pivotal role in shaping the legal and factual
claims judges considered during hearings.
In all three jurisdictions at the time of our study, most petitioners received
extensive pre-hearing legal assistance from court-connected domestic violence
agencies. 101 The assistance domestic agencies offer includes meeting with potential
petitioners to discuss facts, identify potential legal claims, and draft their petitions. As
a result, many petitioners’ cases were relatively well-developed before any hearing. All
petitioners, whether they received individualized assistance or not, had the benefit of
court-provided standardized forms complete with checkboxes for legal claims, lists of
possible forms of relief with fill-in-the-blank options, and definitions of legal terms.
There were no similar services or standardized forms for defendants.
Judges consistently and routinely referred to dates or events alleged in petitions
at the beginning of and throughout the course of hearings. All judges in our study had
the opportunity to review the petition in advance of and during every hearing, and they
often relied on petitions to shape the scope and depth of evidence presentation,
including the questions they asked litigants and scope of testimony they were willing
to entertain. We consistently observed judges reading petitions and explicitly referring
to these pleadings during hearings. We offer a few examples below.
Townville Judge 2
Judge: There are a bunch of allegations in the [petition]. Can you put
them on the record? This incident, the daughter told school and [a
child welfare agency] opened an investigation. Can you tell me some
of the incidents?
___
Judge: Has she hit you before?
Petitioner: Yes.
Judge: It says in the [petition] there’s no history.
Townville Judge 4
Judge: What occurred on May 7th at 10:00 p.m. that caused you to get
a protective order? [The judge says “get” a protective order but this is
a hearing on the merits of that order being granted.]
For a robust description of the assistance available to petitioners, see Steinberg, Carpenter, Shanahan
& Mark, supra note 97.

101
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Petitioner: You said May 7th?
Judge: Your [petition] says May 7.
Plainville Judge 1
Judge: Ready to go? Let me look at your filing. [Reads petition then
swears parties in and turns to petitioner] She’s your former daughter
in law, related by marriage, you filed a police report, you live in
[Plainville], the facts occurred in [Plainville]. Is everything in this
petition true and correct?
___

Judge: [To petitioner, while reading from petition] [The defendant] is
your aunt, you both reside in Plainville, the facts happened here, and
July 25 is the date. Tell me why you need a protective order.
Petitioner: I need a protective order because on July 25 I was being
picked up from my ex’s house, and she called me and told me I’m
going to end up in the hospital and she’s going to end up in jail. And
my worker heard her say it on the phone.
Judge: She used to yell at you in the morning every day? You feel she
will make good on the threat and you don’t feel safe [Doesn’t wait for
answer]?
Judge: [To petitioner’s witness] Are you the co-worker who heard the
call? Tell me what you heard.
At the time of our study, none of the jurisdictions offered standardized
pleading forms or any systematic, court-based assistance for defendants. A defendant’s
only opportunity to raise defenses or counterclaims is in live court, where the judge is
the only lawyer available to assist. We did not observe judges making any efforts to
guide defendants in understanding the possible range and nature of their defenses.
Across our observations, judges did not appear to take steps to account for defendants’
lack of opportunity to answer allegations in writing or the fact that many petitioners,
and few defendants, received substantial legal assistance from nonlawyer advocates.
In most evidentiary hearings, after taking testimony from the petitioner—
guided by the petition—judges simply asked defendants a brief, open-ended question.
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We did not observe judges explaining legal or procedural issues to defendants, such as
the burden of proof, the potential for incriminating themselves, or the legal elements
at issue, as in the examples that follow.
Plainville Judge 1
Judge: [To defendant] What do you need to tell me?
Townville Judge 2
Judge: [To defendant] Anything you want to tell me?
___
Judge: [To defendant] What would you like to tell me?
Centerville Judge 1
Judge: [To defendant] All right, you can ask him questions or tell your
side of the story.
___
Judge: [To defendant] Do you want to state your case then you can call
your witnesses?
ii.

Tightly-Controlled Eliciting and Limiting Evidence

Across the data, judges exerted tight control over evidence presentation by
asking leading questions—including questions based on the petition—and constricting
parties’ opportunity to present testimony, particularly narrative testimony. In the most
common eliciting pattern we observed, judges would ask a litigant a relatively openended question to begin testimony, sometimes by referencing the date or description
of an event in the petition. The judge would then allow the party a short narrative,
often just a sentence or two. Beyond this point, judges showed little interest in or
patience for narrative testimony or party control over the presentation of evidence.
Judges tightly controlled most testimony via restrictive, leading questions and often
shut down parties’ attempts to offer evidence if judges perceived that they were not,
as one judge said, “getting to the point.” 102 Sometimes, judges decided cases after
allowing one or both parties to say no more than a few sentences, as we illustrate with
some striking examples below.

102

Plainville Judge 2.
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In interviews, most judges described confidence in their ability to get relevant
facts on the record via questions, as well as their authorization as a matter of law to do
so. In fact, more than one judge expressed a sentiment that the literature suggests is
common among judges in lawyerless courts: the idea that lawyers make cases and
hearings more complicated and time-consuming given that judges know how to get
the information they need without lawyers’ maneuvering. 103 As Plainville Judge 2 said:
If there are two lawyers, then it’s gonna be a formal hearing, and it
takes for-friggin’-ever, which is fine, but I can get to the truth…I can
get to the facts… I read the petition, and then I ask ‘em questions. I
don’t just say, “Tell me your story,” which is why those protective
order hearings, years ago, could take forever because the pro ses aren’t
good at getting to the point. They wanna talk about how the person
treated them, stole their money, things that are irrelevant in my court.
Plainville Judge 1 expressed slightly less comfort with her role as an active questioner,
describing it as a matter of necessity and efficiency:
I developed a learning curve advantage being on the protective order
docket because you learn how vital it is to be fair…as a protective order
judge, I had to examine them. I didn’t want to have to, and the other
attorneys don’t like it because I’m in their business, but I always give
the other attorney more time on direct. But you have to be efficient.
You couldn’t coddle people but you have to get the facts.
Some judges made statements about the importance of letting litigants present
their case and suggested that they tried to do so in the courtroom. As Plainville Judge
1 put it: “[I ask] Why do you need the protective order? And then I let them tell their
story.” Centerville Judge 2 said, “Oftentimes respondents will say ‘hey, they got to talk
for ten minutes, can I?’ And sure. That’s some people’s idea of fairness.”
However, in contrast to the last two statements above, court observations
showed most judges did not afford parties significant opportunities to give narrative
testimony or shape the order and scope of evidence presentation. This was particularly
true for defendants. Plainville Judge 2’s perspective above about limiting “irrelevant”
testimony and Plainville Judge 1’s statement about “efficiency” and not “coddling”
people are much more consistent with the approach we observed across judges.
Indeed, in another part of her interview, Centerville Judge 2 acknowledged managing
testimony when parties were saying “irrelevant” or “nonsensical” things:

103

JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at ix.
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You have good witnesses, you have very poor witnesses…they say
things that are irrelevant or nonsensical. I try to get them on track
because I know my job is to get enough facts to make the right
decision.
During hearings, we commonly heard judges say things akin to Townville
Judge 4’s statement when he told a litigant, “You have to follow my questions.” In the
example below, Centerville Judge 4 opens a hearing with a statement that appears
designed to prepare parties for being directed and redirected:
Now, the way this hearing will be conducted because you don’t have
attorneys is I will ask the questions. Don’t talk to each other.
Everything you want to say might not be relevant under the law, so
manage your expectations right now.
A striking example of a judge controlling evidence presentation and
limiting the evidence comes from another hearing conducted by Centerville
Judge 4. In this case, the defendant had filed a motion for civil contempt
alleging that the petitioner was not bringing their child to a visitation exchange
point as required by the court’s order. In a hearing that lasted only a few
minutes, the judge suggested the parties were not answering his questions but
then gave them almost no opportunity to speak. He then asserted that the issue
the defendant has raised—enforcement of a visitation order—does not belong
in court at all. He then quickly decided the case, telling the parties to “follow
the order.”
Judge: [To petitioner] This provision is for your protection. Can you
tell me what happened?
Petitioner: The paper says—
Judge: I don’t care what the paper says. The question is are you
bringing the child to the station as the order requires.
Petitioner: They said if he doesn’t text, I don’t have to bring my son.
Defendant: I have texts in my phone.
Judge: You think I’m going to take all this time with all these people
here to go through that. You are both adults. [Both parties start to
speak] I don’t want to get in the middle of hearing you guys argue. You
don’t come here to the court to have your little disagreement. You
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don’t answer my questions and you won’t get heard at all. [To
petitioner] So, you’re telling me he doesn’t text you.
Petitioner: Certain days he does text me.
Judge: Well, I’m denying your motion and everything stays as it is. Go
home and follow the order.
In another example, Centerville Judge 1 presided over a hearing where both
parties had filed petitions against one another. After hearing just a few minutes of
testimony, the judge suddenly decided to dismiss both cases without hearing the facts
that one of the litigants (Litigant 2) might have offered to support his claims. In the
hearing, Centerville Judge 1 first allowed Litigant 1 to offer some evidence to meet her
burden of proof. She alleged serious physical abuse, which the judge repeatedly
dismissed or minimized, as seen in the exchange below:
Litigant 1: He is compulsive and abusive mentally and physically
toward my son and I. He has been raping, abusing, manipulating,
terrorizing. What are the words I’m looking for?
Judge: Words are important, but actions are more important.
Litigant 1: I’m not sure how this man can physically abuse me all these
years and get away with it.
Judge: Whether the criminal justice system works is not at issue here.
What’s at issue is whether he committed an offense [under the statute].
Here, the judge appears to assume the litigant knows the difference between the
criminal and civil systems. He then asks if she has pictures, which she produces on a
phone and hands to the judge’s clerk. It is unclear what role the photos played in the
judge’s final decision as he did not mention them again. Next, Litigant 1 began to
discuss her son and the judge responded, “Your relationship with your son has nothing
to do with this case” and shut down Litigant 1’s testimony on this topic.
Litigant 2 had only a limited opportunity to speak and no real opportunity to
offer facts to support his petition. He only had a chance to deny, as a general matter,
Litigant 1’s allegations and assert that she was mentally ill. Soon after, the judge
suddenly said to Litigant 2, “You filed a case. Why don’t you present it?” Litigant 2’s
subsequent testimony was brief, only a few sentences, including two brief statements
alluding to his claims: “her behavior became unmanageable. Police had been called,
there were family disturbances. I’ve had them come to remove her.” After this
statement, Litigant 1 interrupted, saying “lies.” The exchange below followed:
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Judge: All right, I think I heard enough.
Judge: [To Litigant 1] Your affect and interruptions suggest to me that
you’re not mentally in a position to go forward with this case. Based
on this, I don’t find your testimony credible. Although I appreciate
your apologies, they come with continued ill behavior. There’s also
constant murmuring.
Litigant 1: Really your honor? When your son has been raped by your
baby dad, and when this man is getting away with it, I could care less
what you think about me, but you may go on.
Judge: Accordingly, I am going to dismiss your case and hope you will
seek medical attention.
Litigant 1: Thank you. I will. Thank you.
Judge: [To Litigant 2] I am also going to dismiss your petition. I don’t
think issuing a protective order is going to make things better. And I
don’t see enough evidence.
Litigant 2: What am I supposed to do? Keep calling the police?
Judge: Do the same thing you would do with or without a protection
order. I understand, sir, but I don’t think a protective order is the
appropriate remedy.
In announcing his sudden dismissal of both cases, the judge cited Litigant 1’s
courtroom behavior “affect,” and mental condition as the reason for dismissing her
case. He did not address Litigant 1’s claims of serious physical abuse. And while he
told Litigant 2 that he did not “see enough violence” to support Litigant 2’s claims,
Litigant 2 did not have an opportunity to say more than a few sentences about his
claims. Judge 1 simply never heard the facts Litigant 2 might have offered.
Judges often seemed to have specific ideas about the type of testimony they
wanted to hear. Sometimes judges appeared to be searching for confirmation of the
kind of facts they thought might be relevant in a given case, as the examples below
illustrate:
Plainville Judge 1:
Judge: [Reading petition] All of these events occurred in front of
children?
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Petitioner: They were upstairs.
Judge: But they were present in the house and probably heard?
Townville Judge 2:
Judge: Were there marks on your neck?
Petitioner: No.
Judge: She just grabbed you by the neck and pushed you?
Petitioner: Yes.
Centerville Judge 2:
Judge: And what was [her] condition emotionally? And physically?
Torn clothing, anything like that?
Townville Judge 4
Judge: He was throwing things. He kicked in the door. He’s the owner
of the house? He didn’t really beat you up, did he?
___
Judge: Did you listen to the question? Focus. You go there, you see his
truck. He’s in jail. They don’t take your vehicle. Did you open the door?
Defendant: His truck was there. The police came. [Name] was not
there. [Name] answered. The police said there was a protective order
and he had to leave.
Judge: Did you break the door?
Defendant: No, the cops let me in.
Without knowing each case's underlying facts, we cannot say how often judges’
controlling approach to hearing management caused them to miss critical information.
However, it is undeniable that many litigants in our data, particularly defendants, had
limited opportunities to offer narrative testimony and have their arguments fully heard
by the court. And of course, in the absence of counsel, litigants did not have the
opportunity for anyone acting in their interests to do fact investigation that might
produce evidence supportive of their case – evidence that they did not consider to be
supportive of their case given their lack of legal training. The lack of opportunity for
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narrative and the tendency to ask leading questions cuts against recommendations in
guidance literature, which urges judges to allow parties to be fully heard and
encourages them to ask “neutral” questions.
B. WHY DO JUDGES BEHAVE SIMILARLY?
This study reveals surprisingly homogeneous behavior by judges across diverse
jurisdictions with pro se litigants, in ways that bear little resemblance to reform of the
judicial role. Rather than offering the accommodation and assistance that guidance
suggests, judges maintained court complexity and exercised tight control over hearings
and party testimony.
How is it possible that all of the judges in our study behaved in such similar
ways? Why did they resist offering explanations and information to litigants and refuse
to answer questions? Why did they use so much jargon? Why did they limit the
evidence they were willing to hear and consistently use leading questions to shape
testimony? Why did they rely so heavily on petitions to drive information gathering?
In this section, we suggest three possible explanations for judges’ similar behavioral
choices. These explanations draw on three contextual factors that cut across all
jurisdictions and may work separately or collectively to shape judges’ courtroom
behavior.
Critically, we note that each of the factors we describe below are symptoms of
the fundamental problem in lawyerless courts: civil justice system design. 104 American
civil courts were designed for adversarial, procedural contests driven by lawyers on
both sides of a case. They were not designed to be navigated by users who lack legal
training and must advocate for themselves while facing potentially life-altering
consequences based on the outcome of their case. The judicial behavior we observed
in this study is rooted, more than anything else, in the core design and purpose of civil
courts and the role that judges were originally expected to play in this system. The
existing incentives for judges to behave in new ways that are helpful to both sides of
a pro se case are much weaker than judges’ incentives to behave in ways that are more
consistent with their historical role in civil litigation.
With the understanding that the civil justice system was not designed for
people without counsel, we suggest three factors in our data that may influence judicial
behavior. First and most important is the interaction between sparse formal law and
judges’ traditional assumptions about their role. Judges in our study consistently
reported that they were unclear about the ethical bounds of their role. In the face of
104 In previous and ongoing work, we examine broader structural perspectives on this issue. See supra
n. 10 and 13.
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this ambiguity, they appeared to fall back on commonly shared assumptions about
how a civil judge should behave, assumptions likely shaped by their acculturation and
training in the legal profession. Second, judges were under pressure to decide cases
quickly in their high-volume dockets, which limited the amount of time they could
spend offering pro se assistance. In addition, the incentives to “move” cases along
appeared stronger and more concrete than the incentive to help people without
counsel, incentives that included feedback from court administrators about docket
management but not about pro se assistance. Third, imbalanced pre-hearing legal
assistance in protective order cases resulted in petitioners’ having factually and legally
well-developed cases while defendants did not. Judges’ reliance on petitioners’
pleadings, whether consciously or unconsciously, may have been influenced by docket
pressure and seemed to limit the universe of facts judges were willing to consider.
These three factors may have exerted independent pressure that shaped particular
aspects of judges’ behavior and may also have acted in concert to influence how judges
operationalize their role in lawyerless courts. We discuss each of these factors in more
detail below.
1. Ethical Ambiguity and Legal Training
Previous research has suggested that state trial court judges face ethical
ambiguity regarding the proper scope and nature of their role in lawyerless cases. 105 In
prior studies, judges have described a process of on-the-job role development and a
lack of clarity in how to implement ethical standards. 106 In interviews, the judges in
our study confirmed their struggles to balance duties of impartiality and fairness with
the practical task of assisting pro se parties in a system that is not designed for litigants
without lawyers. In fact, despite the lack of assistance judges offered to litigants in the
courts we observed, we show below that judges believed they were doing all that they
could to assist people without counsel within the bounds of their role.
In the face of ethical ambiguity, judges may have defaulted to their original
training as lawyers in an adversarial system, including baseline assumptions about the
appropriate role of a judge that include assumptions about the importance of
appearing impartial and unbiased. The judges in our study were all lawyers before they
took the bench. 107 All were trained in a relatively homogenous legal education
See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13; Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan, and Mark, supra
note 4; Carpenter, supra note 13.
106 Id.
107 BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 14–15 (2010)
(noting that judges have a shared background as lawyers and “tend to come from a very select group of
individuals who have thrived within the institution of legal thought”). We note, though, the
phenomenon of non-lawyer judges in the also under-researched field of municipal courts, which serve
both criminal and civil functions. See Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV.
964 (2020) (discussing the criminal law functions of municipal courts).
105
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system. 108 The norms of adversary process and the tracks worn down by years of legal
training and practice may ultimately be far too ingrained in judges’ minds and
behaviors to be overcome by merely permissive ethical rules, the pressure of pro se
dockets, or admonishments from judicial training programs. Matthew Tokson’s
empirical research on judicial decision making is instructive and consistent with these
findings. 109 Tokson draws on cognitive psychology to explain how unconscious biases,
including preferences for the status quo, shape judges’ behavior, stating:
Judges may be motivated to resist legal changes that increase their
decision costs by increasing the time and effort necessary to address a
legal issue or by increasing the cognitive difficulty of decision making.
They can also develop biases in favor of laws that they have repeatedly
applied and justified in the past. And they may develop preferences for
familiar doctrines and an aversion to any departure from a longstanding status quo. 110
In interviews, when we asked judges how they think about and approach their
role in pro se cases, they described fairness as their touchstone principle and how this
principle required them to intervene in and manage pro se cases, a finding consistent
with previous research. 111 However, the judges also described their struggles with the
ethical bounds of the active role, articulating that they had to find their own,
individualized approach to ensuring fairness in the courtroom, or as one judge put it,
“go rogue.” 112 Notably, judges in Centerville, who were required to attend regular
training programs about running dockets, described similar challenges as judges in
Plainville.
Plainville Judge 1 said, “I did look at the canons, but I did not find that it was
helpful. I developed a “smell test.” Judges in Centerville expressed similar ideas.
Centerville Judge 1, for example, articulated that he did not have sufficient guidance
and said he did not think the judicial role in pro se courts was “particularly codified.”
He added, “I don’t see it as a developed jurisprudence. I think dealing with pro se

Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 1, 40
(2012) (“Legal training is largely homogeneous – lawyers are trained in effectively identical law schools
with the same curriculum and methods.”); Matthew J. Wilson, U.S. Legal Education Methods and Ideals:
Application to the Japanese and Korean Systems, 18 CARDOZO K. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW 295, 295–97, 300
(2010) (“The curriculum at most U.S. law schools follows a standard pattern.”); Carole Silver, Getting
Real About Globalization and Legal Education: Potential and Perspectives for the U.S., 24 STAN. L. & POLˈY REV.
457, 464 (2013) (noting that U.S. law schools have a “somewhat standardized” curriculum, particularly
in the first year).
109 See Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 916–923 (2015).
110 Id. at 903.
111 See Carpenter, supra note 13, at 685.
112 For a discussion of similar findings from previous research, see Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra
note 13.
108
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litigants is in its nascent phase.” Centerville Judge 1 also said it is important to be
“tethered by the law” and then went on to say:
In a few cases I think I made a difference. That’s what I want anyway,
to make a difference for people. But it is so hard just to be the referee
but also want to get involved…The natural inclination is to help the
side that is unrepresented, but you are still cabined by judicial
ethics…I’m good at violating—that’s not the right word—I’m good at
going rogue. The ends justify the means kind of thing…So I have to
push hard on myself to say, “what are the rules, what am I allowed to
do.” The rules say I can’t speak with [unrepresented people] for a
particular reason, but I’ve always pushed that. I won’t do things I can’t
do, but otherwise I’ll push. I’m not saying other judges are wrong, but
they’ll say, “I can’t help you I’ve got my rules.”
Plainville Judge 2 also expressed the sense that he had to “bend” the rules or get close
to a “limit” to help unrepresented people.
I’ll help [unrepresented people] out more than I should, and I know
that. I bend over backwards to help them as much as I can, but, boy,
there’s a limit to it. Technically, they’re supposed to be held to the same
level. It’s kinda hard to do that and still believe that you’re running a
fair court, ‘cause they don’t know how, so I bend it, and I shouldn’t. I
know I shouldn’t, every time I do it, but I still do it.
To the extent judges were confused about their role in pro se cases and fell back
on traditional judicial behavior, they may have had good reason. As described in detail
in Part II, although many court systems and access to justice advocates have prescribed
recommended ways judges can help people without counsel, this guidance material is
merely advisory and the gap between such recommendations and formal law is
massive. 113 Even in Centerville, which has gone farther than most other jurisdictions
in the country, specific forms of assistance are merely “encouraged,” not required, and
those encouraged behaviors are discussed in the most summary and general terms.
The shared ethical confusion across judges in this study suggests that efforts like
Centerville’s, which are among the strongest in the county, are still not sufficient to
ensure judges implement recommended pro se assistance. Without more scaffolding to
support the new judicial role, judges appear to fall back on their legal training and
acculturation, which includes the historical role of judicial passivity as a marker of
impartiality and judicial assistance for litigants as a marker of bias.

113

See Tokson, supra note 109 for a discussion of how judges resist changes to the status quo.
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2. Docket Pressure
A very pragmatic factor might have shaped the behavior we observed: time. 114
The recommendations for judicial role reform and pro se assistance are inherently timeconsuming. The judges we observed may have had, or perceived that they had, very
little time to spare. Judges in most lawyerless courts, like those in our study, face
massive docket pressure from high-volume court calendars. In fact, commentators
have drawn an analogy between lawyerless civil courts and emergency rooms. 115 Like
the emergency department of a hospital, civil courts have no choice but to process the
cases brought before them, no matter the resource-constraints they might face. 116
These pressures flow downstream and shape the day-to-day work of trial judges.
In interviews, judges discussed feeling time pressure from litigants—many of
whom had to wait for long periods, sometimes hours, to have their cases called—and
from court administrators who wanted to keep court calendars moving. The highvolume and high-pressure nature of the dockets we observed may influence the extent
to which judges are willing to take time to offer individualized explanations to
individual litigants or to give every single litigant the chance to offer lengthy testimony.
As a matter of incentives, the judges in our study faced more external pressure to call
and decide cases quickly than to offer pro se assistance.
Given the number of cases calendared each day, judges faced daily time
pressure to call the case of every litigant waiting in the courtroom. They also faced
longer-term time pressure to ensure cases did not linger on court calendars. In all three
jurisdictions we observed dozens of protective order cases were calendared for a
morning time block, typically between nine and early afternoon. The courtrooms were
often too small for all litigants to sit down, which meant courtrooms could be standing
room only, particularly at the beginning of a docket call in the morning. Some cases,
such as those without service on the defendant, could be resolved in less than a minute.
Evidentiary hearings took much more time.

See id. at 912 (regarding judicial resistance to time and effort costs).
See e.g., Carrie Johnson, Legal Help for the Poor in a ‘State of Crisis’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 15, 2012),
https://www.npr.org/2012/06/15/154925376/legal-help-for-the-poor-in-state-of-crisis (“This isn't a hospital.
But it is a kind of emergency room, for people who need help, right away, with all kinds of legal
problems.”).
116 See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 10, at 129 (noting that courts have “no choice” but to serve
litigants and handle cases “despite the mismatch between design and reality); see also Colleen F.
Shanahan, Alyx Mark, Jessica K. Steinberg & Anna E. Carpenter, Covid, Crisis, and Courts, 99 TEXAS L.
REV. ONLINE 10 (2020) (describing the historical challenges of state civil courts and the pandemicrelated intensification of these challenges and resulting innovation); Andrew Hammond, Ariel Jurow
Kleiman & Gabriel Scheffler, How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should Reshape the American Safety Net,
105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 154 (2020) (showing how lack of government assistance has
exacerbated economic and racial inequality historically and how these negative consequences have and
will continue to increase in the face of the pandemic).
114
115
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In Centerville, judges described significant time pressure from court
administrators. Judge 1 said, “In busy courthouses like this there’s always tension
between justice and moving the calendar. There’s pressure from the—we call them the
suits—to move the cases.”
This judge went on to describe how this pressure was systematic, with judges
throughout the courthouse receiving statistics about docket management:
Yeah, we get these statistics about who’s moving cases, how we’re
moving cases. We see stats every month, how many trials we’ve done.
And it’s particular to judges, so you know how you’re doing. We’d
always have these meetings about moving cases…
Centerville Judge 2 expressed similar sentiments about pressure from court
administrators and also described her perception of impatience from litigants:
We are under a lot of pressure to get cases resolved. My own approach
is to manage the issues of moving the case along but feeling I have
given enough time to the case that I can make a good ruling…The
litigants even are impatient. I tell them, think about this like going to
the doctor. You can’t predict when you’ll get out. You have to wait
sometimes.
Plainville Judge 1 said that she felt “a huge pressure” to ensure parties had a swift
resolution to their case and described starting her dockets at nine in the morning and
often staying on the bench until the afternoon to ensure all of the day’s cases were
handled.
The baseline reality of constant pressure to resolve cases may play a key role in
preventing judges from even attempting to offer pro se assistance. This may be
particularly true where institutional pressure to “move” cases – such as the pressure
placed on judges by court administrators in the form of regular reports on case
statistics – is stronger, more systematic, and contains more feedback loops than any
pressure they might face to offer assistance to pro se litigants. After all, while some of
the judges in our study were trained on judicial role reform, none of them received
routine feedback on how they performed in helping people without counsel. In
contrast, they did receive feedback on how they were managing their busy, crowded
dockets.
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3. Legal Assistance for Petitioners Only
Some of the behavior we observed, particularly judges’ tight control over
evidence presentation and the constraints they placed on party testimony, could be
shaped by differences in case development between petitioners and defendants. In the
courts we studied, only petitioners received robust, systematic, pre-hearing case
development assistance. 117 Defendants did not. As a result, petitioners’ pleadings were
the only written articulation of factual and legal allegations in any given case. Judges
leaned heavily on these pleadings to shape how they controlled and managed evidence
presentation.
The fact that petitioners’ cases were succinctly and predictably presented in a
form pleading may have, unconsciously or consciously, led judges to rely on them and
constrained their thinking about the possible universe of claims or defenses in a given
case. This possibility, combined with docket pressure, may have influenced judges to
take the most straightforward, efficient route to put facts on the record: relying on the
petition, asking leading questions, and limiting party narrative, a behavior that may not
be ideal from a pro se assistance or due process perspective, but may be consistent with
the tangible pressures judges face. 118
Even as judges relied on pre-hearing case development for petitioners to share
hearings, they did not offer counter-balancing assistance to defendants in developing
defenses during hearings. A possible reason is that judges did not believe they were
permitted to provide such support in their role as judges. Ethical confusion,
assumptions about the judges’ proper role, and lack of clarity about acceptable
behavior may have stood in the way of judges offering case development support to
defendants.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This study was designed to offer a comparative picture of how judges behave
in lawyerless courts and whether they are implementing recommendations from more
than two decades of calls for judicial role reform and pro se assistance. The results reveal
a group of judges spread across the country who have chosen to operationalize their
role and alter courtroom procedure in unexpectedly homogenous ways. Yet, their
actions are notably inconsistent with the prevailing vision of judicial role reform.
Rather than offering assistance and accommodation consistent with the active,
117 For a complete discussion of petitioner assistance and the lack of defendant assistance in the courts
we studied, as well as the implications of this imbalance, see Steinberg, Carpenter, Shanahan & Mark,
Judges and Deregulation, supra note 97. In addition, the limited appellate case law on protective orders in
our study has been powerfully shaped by the small group of legal services lawyers who systematically
advocate for petitioners. Defendants have no such systematic advocacy.
118 For a fuller discussion of due process issues and defendants in our study, see id.
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reformed judicial role, judges maintain court complexity, including using jargon and
refusing to explain court processes and legal terms, strictly control and limit party
testimony, and do not adjust their behavior to account for the consistent and robust
pre-hearing case development assistance provided to only one side of the cases we
studied.
In this section, we discuss the implications of this study and critique the
existing approach to judicial role reform as an attempt to solve the massive structural
problem of lawyerless adversarial courts through individual judge-level decision
making and discretion. We close by offering recommendations for changing this
flawed approach with the assumption that the fundamental design of civil courts will
remain the same. In traditional civil litigation, judicial role reform will not become a
meaningful access to justice solution unless and until judges are incentivized to offer
it through formal, detailed requirements, consistent feedback mechanisms, and a
reduction in docket pressure. 119 We urge courts interested in promoting changes to the
judicial role in traditional courts to take such steps.
We emphasize that our recommendations for formalizing judicial assistance
assume no changes to the fundamental structure of the civil courts’ adversarial dispute
resolution processes and goals. In other work, we have shown how courts could shift
away from individual dispute resolution and toward an approached aimed at solving
deeper social problems and pursuing broader goals of community well-being. 120 Such
problem-solving approaches would allow for and even require a certain amount of
informality, to be sure, but as we have described, the informality of problem-solving
courts is mediated by a level of judicial empowerment, investigatory authority, and
decisional flexibility that does not exist in traditional courts. 121
Today, decades after the pro se crisis began, this study reinforces that America’s
civil courts and their dispute resolution processes still presuppose professional legal
representation for every litigant. 122 The fundamental design of the civil justice system
remains adversarial, party-driven, and procedurally complex. Supporters of judicial
role reform argue that judges can offer sufficient assistance to help people without
counsel navigate this system. For years, access to justice stakeholders have advocated

For findings about formal expectations from this study, see Part III(b)(1). For findings about the
role of feedback in reinforcing docket management, see Part III(b)(2). For previous research showing
that judges alter their behavior in response to detailed, formal guidance and internal peer review
processes, including learning how to improve their own courtroom behavior by reviewing other
judges’ work in hearings, see Carpenter, supra note 13, at 700–04.
120 See Steinberg, supra note 7; Colleen F. Shanahan, Alyx Mark, Jessica K. Steinberg & Anna E.
Carpenter, Covid, Crisis, and Courts, 99 TEXAS L. REV. ONLINE 10, 7 (2020).
121 See e.g., Steinberg, supra note 7, at 1610.
122 Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 3, at 257, 262.
119
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for the vision of a helpful judge who simplifies court procedures, offers information
and explanations, and ensures both parties to a case have the opportunity to be heard.
However, the promise of judges who offer assistance and accommodation in
lawyerless courts is far from being realized in the courts we studied. The key reason
for this failure is that the scaffolding and support for judicial role reform is spotty and
insufficient. In addition, judges face other, stronger, pressures, such as the pressure to
clear court calendars, traditional assumptions about the proper role of the judge, and
concerns about impartiality. Even Centerville’s efforts, which are among the strongest
in the nation – but still do not require judicial assistance – have not pushed judges to
offer meaningful pro se assistance.
If these dynamics hold true in other jurisdictions, our study strongly suggests
implementing true reform of the traditional judicial role and pushing judges to offer
pro se assistance will require broader and deeper investment in concretely defining,
carefully restructuring, and reinforcing that role – including giving judges time and
space to provide such assistance. This is particularly true because changing the judicial
role is, fundamentally, a solution that aims to patch holes in the civil justice system, as
opposed to altering its basic adversarial design. Role reform is a solution that works
within the existing system. As such, judges will always face countervailing pressures. If
courts do not offer judges more support and continue to rely on individual judges to
determine how and when to assist people without counsel, judges will likely continue
to fall back on traditional passivity and court complexity, as we see in this study.
State court systems wishing to promote judicial role reform should formally
require judges to offer such assistance and offer concrete descriptions of the type of
assistance judges are required to provide, to whom, and in what form, and in what
contexts. Such assistance could come in the form of revised ethical canons, new
procedural rules specific to pro se cases, or appellate decisions. Previous research
suggests that, ideally, judges’ responsibilities would be articulated and reinforced in all
of these ways. 123 Formalizing the steps judges should take to assist pro se litigants also
promotes transparency and accountability by articulating expected behavior in
advance.
Such changes must, at a minimum, offer judges specific language and
behaviors for the cases they are adjudicating. For example, judges in the courts we
studied would benefit from clear rules about the kind of assistance they should offer
to defendants who have had no case development assistance and where petitioners
have had such assistance. What legal, procedural, and practical information should
judges offer defendants? Should they actively raise potential defenses? Such changes
123

Id. at 679–82, 700–04.
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could also include comprehensive “demand side” reforms that require courts to
support pro se litigants and drive litigation in much more systematic ways for both
parties, such as serving process and developing factual and legal claims in advance of
hearings. 124
Our recommendation for formalizing pro se assistance diverges from the
majority view expressed in the judicial role reform literature. 125 The primary approach
advocated by scholars and access to justice stakeholders to date has focused on
promoting informality and giving judges the flexibility and discretion to make in-themoment decisions about what level of assistance to offer in pro se cases. 126 We have
previously studied and critiqued this informal, “principles over procedures” approach
and advocated for the value of clear rules to guide judges’ behavior. 127 In fact, in a
recent study of an administrative court where most litigants were unrepresented,
judges’ behavior and views about the scope and nature of pro se assistance were mostly
consistent, and judges were most willing to take an active role in offering assistance,
in areas where formal requirements were most clear and specific. 128
In addition to requiring judicial assistance through detailed, formal guidance,
courts can draw on lessons from other adjudicative contexts to create accountability
and transparency through peer review and feedback. For example, in the
unemployment insurance appeals context, judges are required to routinely review and
rate one another’s performance in hearings. One study found that this peer review
process incentivizes role reform and assistance because judges know they will be
reviewed and also have the opportunity to see how other judges conduct hearings. 129
Courts could formalize a similar process to ensure that formal requirements for pro se
assistance are being followed and to normalize the reformed judicial role in trial courts.
Finally, this study suggests that meaningful pro se assistance will require courts
to give judges more time to handle cases. This is particularly true where judges are
expected to offer detailed explanations of law, process, and procedure and to allow
each party a full opportunity to present evidence and testimony. Where courts expect
judges to alter their role and help solve the crisis of lawyerless courts, courts must offer
judges the time, space, and incentives that support this change.
See Steinberg, Demand Side Reform, supra note 8.
For a discussion of two proposals by Russell Pearce and Jessica K. Steinberg that are exceptions,
see Part II(a) supra.
126 See infra Part I; see also Carpenter, supra note 13, at 668, 689; Sabbeth, supra note 7.
127 See Carpenter, supra note 13, at 690 (describing an example of the downsides of informality,
particularly where one party has access to representation and one does not); Steinberg, Demand-Side
Reform, supra note 8, at 947–63.
128 See Carpenter, supra note 13, at 700–04 (discussing the role of appellate court decisions, peer
review, and requirements issued by a federal administrative agency with oversight authority in shaping
judicial behavior).
129 Id.
124
125
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The drumbeat of support for changes to the judicial role combined with the
lack of evidence about how judges actually behave in pro se cases has obscured the
serious challenges facing people without counsel in our civil trial courts and the
practical failures of judicial role reform. Judges in trial courts have been asked to bear
a set of responsibilities that they are currently ill-equipped to implement. This study
shows the need for renewed efforts to restructure and redesign judicial behavior and
the burden judges bear in ensuring access to justice, including evaluating the progress
of those efforts over time. For too long, courts and scholars have left judicial behavior
in civil trial courts unexamined and unreviewed. We hope our work inspires other
scholars to explore the operation of civil justice in state courts and to join the
conversation about increasing access to justice for all Americans, regardless of their
socioeconomic status and ability to access legal representation.
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